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INTRODUCTION
On December 17,2002, President Bush signed the new Pipeline Safety
Improvement Act of 2002 (H.R. 3609). The law capped years of efforts by the National
Transportation Safety Board, state governments, community activists and others to
strengthen the nation's pipeline safety laws. The need for change became painfully
obvious in the year 2000. Consider these incidents-

* A 50-year-old El Paso Ener y natural gas pipeline exploded in Carlsbad, New

P

Mexico killing 12 campers, and allegedly contributed to the severity of the
California energy crisis.' Gary Johnson, the Governor of New Mexico, referred
to the scene as one of ''gief unimaginable."'
A gasoline pipeline rupture contaminated a water source for the City of Dallas,
pushed gasoline prices to $2.75 a gallon in the Midwest and led EPA to lower air
quality standards in Chicago and Milwaukee. 4,5,6
Another gasoline pipeline rupture in Michigan caused more than 1200 people to
evacuate from their homes, several for more than three months.'
A fuel oil pipeline ruptured in Prince George's County, Maryland, contaminated
40 miles of shoreline of the Patuxent River and nearby creeks, and resulted in
clean up costs of $71 million dollars?
These were just four of the eighty natural gas pipeline incidents9and 147 hazardous
liquid pipeline incidents in the year 2000.'~Combined, all pipeline incidents in 2000
I
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Reply Brief of El Paso Natural Gas Co. at 3-5, Public Utilities Commission of the State of California v.
El Paso Natural Gas Co., Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n (No. WOO-241-006).
3
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August 21,2000, at 4.
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caused a record setting $197 million in property damage.'' The number of fatalities for
the year (16)12was the highest in 25

It was not a good year.

The above accidents illustrate the two sides of the pipeline safety coin. On the
one hand, pipelines are an efficient and safe way to transport energy. A modest sized
pipeline transports enough gasoline in a single day to take 750 tanker trucks off our
highways.14 Pipelines provide 68% of the nation's gasoline15and virtually all of its
natural gas16through 154,733 miles of liquid pipelines17and 298,198 miles of natural gas
transmission pipelines.18 Meanwhile, pipelines have the lowest number of fatalities
annually of any mode of transportation.I9

On the other hand, because they transport so much material so efficiently, a single
accident has the potential to be vastly more catastrophic than a tanker truck spill.
According to the National Transportation Safety Board, a single pipeline accident,
"...can injure hundreds of persons, affect thousands more, and cost millions of dollars
in.. .property damage, loss of work opportunity, community disruption, ecological
damage, and insurance ~iability."~~
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Today, pipelines are in residential communities, near schoolyards and churches."
That i~astructureis aging-according

to the NTSB, many of the hazardous liquid and

natural gas pipelines in our nation are thirty to fifty years old.22 Periodically verifying
their integrity is essential to protecting both the communities around pipelines and the
communities who depend upon the materials they bring. Yet, pipelines remained
uninspected.
As it studied and reported about accidents, the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) grew increasingly frustrated. Recommendations the Board had made
more than a decade earlier, remained unaddressed, and preventable accidents continued
for the same causes already identified." NTSB Chairman, Jim Hall, criticized industry
efforts to reduce funding for the federal Office of Pipeline Safety and industry's
opposition to stronger regulations. In a speech to the Association of Oil Pipelines, he
suggested that such efforts were effective but shortsighted and reminded the attendees
that fatal transportation incidents could result in criminal chargesz4 After the August

2000 Carlsbad incident, Mr. Hall criticized the state of pipeline regulation saying, "No
American would want to use any transportation vehicle that would not be properly
inspected for 48 years, nor should we have pipelines traveling through any of our

21 Chuck Moseman, Project Director, Shell Pipeline Company LP, Our Pipeline Supporis Stronger
Regulations and Commits to Safeiy, EASTMOUNTAINTELEGRAPH,
Sept. 12,2002 at 5.
Pipeline Safety.. Hearing before the National Transportation Safiiy Board, Nov. 15,2000 (remark of
Chairman Jim Hall).
z3 Id.
24
Speech of Jim Hall, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board to the Association of Oil Pipe
Lines, Dec. 1, 1999.

''

communities in this conditi~n."~~
NTSB had been recommending that OPS require
periodic inspections of pipelines since 1987 to no avaiLZ6
The federal pipeline regulator, the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), was widely
viewed as lax and ineffecti~e.~'Sen. Domenici (R-N.M.) stated, "Unfortunately the
Office of Pipeline Safety has had a poor history of regulation and enf~rcement."~~
Reps.
Dingell (D-MI) and Oberstar @-MN)criticized the OPS failure to issue regulations
requiring pipeline inspections despite a six-year-old Congressional law requiring
inspections.29 Rep. Pascrell (D-NJ) stated, "There is little or no enforcement of existing
regulations.'J0 Lois Epstein, Senior Engineer for Environmental Defense reported that
OPS had not sent one single case to the Department of Justice for prosecution of its
standards in more than a decade?' As of the year 2001, OPS didn't even have a map of

25

Press Release, Chairman Jim Hall, National Transportation Safety Board, Statement on Carlsbad, New
Mexico Pipeline Accident (Aug. 24,2000) (on file with author).
l6Reauthorization of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safeg Act:
Before the Subcomm on Energy and Air Quality of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce (Mar. 19,
2002) (statement of Robert Chipvevich, Director, Office of Railroad, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Investigations, National Transportation Safety Board).
27
Speech ofJim Hall, Chairman, NTSB, supra at note 24 ("There is nowhere today the sense that Office of
Pipeline Safety (OPS) is in charge ...or that its regulations, its inspections, its assets, its staffing and its
s irit, are adequate to the task.").
"147 Cong. Rec. S524 (Sen. Domenici) (2001).
29 "Dear Colleague" lener from Reps. James Oberstar ( M i . ) and John D. Dingell (Mich.) dated
September 18,2000 available at:
h~://www.oi~elineleaks.com/AllLink~/mediousePlSe~t
182000.htm.
' O 146 Cong. Rec. H7841 (Rep. Pascrell) (2000).
Lois Epstein, Letter to the Editor, As Pipelines Pollute, An Agency Does Nada, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 11,
2000, at A4 I .

the pipelines it regulated." The Office of Pipeline Safety was the butt of editorial

States wanted more power over pipelines and many thought they would do better
than OPS. Washington state representatives asked Congress to protect state (rather than
federal) interstate pipeline in~~ections.'~
An activist questioned the need for federal
preemption.35A city attorney from Fredericksburg, Virginia testified that his city had
lost its public water supply to a pipeline failure not once, but t ~ i c e . 3A~representative of
state government inspectors &om Minnesota complained to Congress that the Department
of Transportation was summarily limiting states' roles in inspecting pipelines despite
statutory language granting states such authority?' The National Association of Pipeline

Mike Madden Bush: Speed Pipeline Reviews, BELLINGHAM
HERALD,
Jan. 28,2001; Reauthorization of
Dep't of Transp. Oflce offipeline Safely.. Before the Subcomm. On Highways and Transit of the House
Tramp. Cbmm., (Feb. 13,2002) (statement of Mark R. Dayton, Deputy Assistant Inspector General, U.S.
Dep't of Tmsp., on the topic of OPS' program for pipeline operators to voluntarily submit mapping
information, "This progress is too little, too late. OPS should move forward on a ~ h u k i n for
g mandatory
reporting of these data immediately.")
33
See, e.g., Ben Sargeant, AUSTIN-AMERICAN
STATESMAN,
JuI. 2001 (On the appropriate voice mail
message for a caller to receive when calling the Office of Pipeline Safety to notify them of an accident,
"You have reached the U.S. Office of Pipeline Safety... for 'Tsk, Tsk,' Press 1, for 'Tut, Tut,' Press 2, for
'Wow! Tough Break!' Press 3, for 'Good Luck-You're Going to Need It!' Press 4.") (on file with author).
Reauthorization of DepY of Transp. W c e of Pipeline Safety: B&e the Subcomm. On Highways and
Transit of the House Transp. Comm., (Feb. 13,2002) (statement by Chuck Moser, Chairman, Washington
State Citizens Committee on Pipeline Safety, "We believe it is critical that OPS be directed in law to
establish partnerships with willing states and delegate to these states authority to oversee interstate
ipelines. This is our number one priority.")
Hearing on the Bellingham, Washington Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Explosion: Befoe the Subcomm. on
Econ. Dev., Pub. Bldgs., Hazardous Materials, and Pipeline Transp. of the House Comm. on Tramp. and
Infrashrcfure, ,(Oct. 27, 1999) (testimony of Carl Weimer, Safe Bellingham, "To take but one example,
the trucking industry, whose fleets criss-cross our state borders thousands of times a day, are subject to
safety requirements at the state and local level.. . The sooner states and local government are given the
power to protect their citizens, the sooner we will see significant advances made in safety protection for
this industry.").
36 Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., (May 11,2000).
37
Hearings Before Senate Cbmm. on Commerce, Sci. and Tramp., (May 4,2000) (testimony of Charles R.
Kenow, Vice-Chairman ofNational Association of Pipeline Safety, "...recent actions by DOT to
summarily limit the states' past role in inspecting interstate pipelines remains of concern... The removal
and limitation of state resources is analogous to disengaging a seasoned, trained force and their field
commander from the battlefield and replacing them with a force from a foreign country that does not know
the local customs, people, terrain or rules of engagement...History has proven, more than once, this isn't
the way to win the battle.")

'

Safety Representatives suggested that state inspectors would do more frequent and
thorough pipeline inspections than OPS could do with its limited resources?' The
General Accounting Office (GAO) agreed with them.)9 The dissatisfaction with OPS
was apparently deep and wide.
Community activists formed in the cauldron of the Bellingham pipeline
explosion, testified to

Marlene Robinson, whose son, Liam Wood,

suffocated on gasoline fumes while fishing in Whatcom Creek, reported, "Every living
thing in the creek was killed for a mile and a half. Trees were incinerated and rocks
cracked in the 2000 degree heateU4'She complained that control room operators lacked
training, and that OPS required no inspections and was unduly influenced by the interests
of industry.42

In contrast, the industry's testimony sometimes seemed oddly oblivious to real
world events. The Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA) complained
that requiring inspections of natural gas pipelines would interrupt natural gas service and
be costly to consumers.43 However, unsafe pipelines could cause interruptions of service,
" Reauthorization of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Energy and Air Quality of the House Energy and Commerce Comm.
(Mar. 19,2002) (statement of James D. Anderson, National Vice-President National Association of
Pipeline Safety Representatives, "The ability to inspect these facilities using OPS guidelines and training
will provide assistance to the OPS in performing more frequently and thorough assistance than have
normally been performed due to lack of OPS resources.")
39 Ofice of Pipeline Safety Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Mar. 19,2002 at (testimony of Peter F. Guerrero, Dir. Of
Physical Infrastructure Issues, General Accounting Office).
The Bellingham, WashingtonHazardous Liquid Pipeline Incident: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Econ. Dev., Pub. Bldgs., Hazardous Materials and Pipeline Transportation of the House Comm. on
Transp. And Infrastructure (Oct. 27, 1999) (Witness List).
41
Reauthorization of the W c e of Pipeline Safety: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Highways and Transit
House Comm. on Trans. And Infrahucture (Feb. 13,2002) (testimony of Marlene Robinson).

"

....

" Reauthorization of the Natural

Gas Pipeline Safety Act and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce
(Mar. 19,2002) (statement of William J. Haener, Vice-President of Nahual Gas CMS Engineer Corp. on
behalf of the Interstate Natural Gas Ass'n of America).

too." If undiscovered corrosion were occurring on the nation's aging pipelines, not
inspecting them would not protect reliability of service-it

would invite interruptions due

to unanticipated ruptures.
A natural gas utility representative testified that the industry opposed prescriptive
legislative approaches, complaining that one size fits all wouldn't fit pipelines.45 But less
than three weeks afterwards, in the criminal prosecution pertaining to the fatal
Bellingham pipeline accident, the defendant pipeline companies moved to dismiss their
indictment on the basis of vagueness. They complained that existing OPS regulations
implementing the Pipeline Safety Act were so vague that, "...even industry experts
cannot say what is required by these regulations."46 If Congress meant to give the wishywashy Office of Pipeline Safety meaningful direction, it's difficult to see how it could
pass anything but prescriptive legislation.
In the end, Congress passed a tougher law with many prescriptive

standard^.^'

It

was not enough to satisfy one parent whose child died in the Bellingham accident:'
however, the statute does impose many new requirements on pipeline operators.
The new Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 has been three years in the
making. Understanding the statute requires:
1)

A basic understanding of pipelines;

2)

An appreciation of the safety challenges posed by recent incidents;

Energy Policy Act of 2002, H.R 4,148" Cong. 5 778a4-5 (2002).
Reauthorization ofthe Naiural Gas Pipeline Safety Act and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality oftke House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
(Mar. 19,2002) (testimony of Herman Moms, Jr. President and CEO Memphis Light, Gas and Water).
46
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Indictment on Vagueness Grounds at 12, U.S.A. v. Olympic Pipe Line
Co., (No. CR01-338R).
17
Udall Press Release, supra at note 13.
Ellyn Ferguson, Politicians Hail New Pipeline Bill; Father Critical, BELLINGHAM
HERALD, Nov. 16,
2002.
45

"

3)

An overview of the new requirements, and a comparison with the old

statute; and,
4)

An understanding of how the new requirements might have prevented or

mitigated previous accidents.
With this foundation, we can then ask, what more could/should Congress do?
Pipeline safety is important because, without public confidence in pipelines, communities
will oppose the siting of new pipelines. As our nation grows, managing its energy needs
requires new pipelines. As such, an understanding of these facilities and how Congress
regulates them contributes to our appreciation of their costs and benefits.

THE BASICS OF PIPELINE OPERATION
Backmound
Pipelines are steel pipes49that transport liquid and gas materials from the place
where they are produced to where they are needed?' Most oil and gas pipelines in the
United States are constructed of longitudinally welded pipe5' or seamless pipe (smaller
sizes)." The pipes are coated to prevent corrosion.''
Many different materials are transported by pipeline including natural gas, crude
oil, refined products (gasoline, jet he1 and diesel), natural gas liquids (including such
components as ethane, propane and butane), and carbon d i ~ x i d e ?These
~
materials begin
their pipeline journey from tankers at coastal ports, oil or gas wells, or refineries."

49

JOHN L. KENNEDY,OIL AND GASPIPELME
FLNDAMENTALS
Idat 1

Id.at 60.
%Id. at 28-43.
55 Id. at 1.5.
53

49 (F'ennWell Publ'g.) ('Znd ed. 1993)

Pipelines deliver these materials across thousands of miles to where they are needed.'6
f-2

The final destination may be a home (natural

a refined products terminal that

supplies local gas stations (refined products);8 a petrochemical factory (natural gas
or an oil refinery (crude
A pipeline network is controlled by a supervisory control and data acquisition
system (SCADA).~' This consists of computer hardware and software that can regulate
pressure and flow, start and stop pumps and compressors, and monitor the functioning of
the pipeline.62 Remote units measure operating conditions and transmit the data to a
central control system.63 The centrally located control system is staffed 24 hours a day,
365 days a year.64
Hazardous Liauid versus Natural Gas Pipelines
Natural gas pipelines are regulated differently than liquid pipelines.65 First, the
/-;

pipelines that carry natural gas in large quantity over long distances (transmission
pipelines) are distinguished from smaller local delivery pipelines (distribution
pipelines).66 In addition, natural gas pipelines are divided further into class locations
(Class 1,2,3 or 4 with increasing human proximity).67 Safety measures differ in these
areas. For example, if, when a pipeline is built, it is in a Class 2 area but more homes are
id. at 1.
" ~ dat. 1.
Id. at 37.
' 9 Id. at 37.
60 Id. at 6.
Id. at 215.
62 Id.
63 Id.
ASSOC.
of Oil Pipe Lines, Pipeline Indushy Fact-Using Control Systemsfor Pipeline Operation and
Monitoring, at hm:llwww.awl.ord~ubs/facts.html.
65
See, e.g., Transportation of natural gas and other gas by pipeline: minimum Federal safety standards, 49
C.F.R. 5 192 (2002); Transportation of hazardous liquids by pipeline, 49 C.F.R. 5 195 (2002).
66 Compare 49 C.F.R. 55 192.705,706,707,709,711,713,715,717,719 (2002) with 49 C.F.R. $9 721
and 723 (2002).
67
Class locations, 49 C.F.R. 192.5 (2002).
'6

''

P\

built near the pipeline (changing the classification to Class 3), the company may be
required to operate the pipeline at a lower pressure.68
Historically, liquid pipelines had rules that were less specific. There were no
special regulations for populated areas. However, in December 2000, the Department of
Transportation (DOT)Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA)
promulgated new regulations that, for the first time, required liquid pipeline companies to
identify where their pipelines could affect "high consequence areas" and mandated
inspections in those areas6' Because spilled liquids behave differently than natural gas,

high consequence areas include not only areas of high population but also commercial
waterways and areas that are "unusually ~ensitive."~~
Monitoring the Integlitv of Pivelines
Although control room SCADA operators monitor pipelines, by the time the
operator has notice of a problem due to a drop in pressure or change in flow rate, a
release has probably already occurred. Because pipeline accidents can have severe
consequences, being able to prevent accidents is critically important. Prevention requires
periodically testing the integrity of the pipeline.
Integrity testing begins when a pipeline is first constructed. Welds are x-rayed7'
and before the pipeline is filled with the material it will transport, it is "hydrotested." A
hydrotest entails filling a segment of the pipeline with water and pressurizing it to
observe that it will hold the pressure for a certain period.72 For example, hazardous
68

Change in class location: C o n f i t i o n or revision of maximum allowable operating pressure, 49 C.F.R.

5 192.611 (2002).
High co"sequmce Areas, 49 C.F.R.§ 195.450 (2002).
Id. ## (1) and (4); 49 C.F.R. 5 195.6 (2002) (these include m
g
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71
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72

Id. at 162.
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liquid pipelines must be tested for four hours at 125 percent of the maximum operating
pressure.73 Because the hydrotest is done at a higher pressure than the pressure at which
the pipeline will be operated, this assures a level of strength greater than necessary to
prevent the pipeline from rupturing during normal operation. Hydrotesting is required for
new pipeline constr~ction?~
Hydrotesting has the advantage that it gives positive proof that the pipeline will
hold a certain pressure without leaking or rupturing. However, it has the disadvantage
that it interrupts service, if used on an operating pipeline?5 It also introduces water into
the pipeline, which, if not completely removed, may cause internal corr~sion?~
Another way of monitoring integrity is with internal in-line inspection devices,
also known as "smart pigs."77 "Smart pigs" are internal inspection instruments that can
detect some (not all) defects in pipelines.78
It is not enough to internally inspect a pipeline with a smart pig to prevent
accidents. An engineer must correctly interpret the data from the smart pig. If the
pipeline has had prior internal inspections, a comparison of the new inspection report
with the old one can be critical in correctly interpreting the data. Changes in the data
from one inspection to the next are likely to reflect changes in the pipe. The skill of the
engineer interpreting the smart pig data is a key component to an effective internal
inspection program.

73

Test pressure, 49 C.F.R. $ 195.304 (2002).
"See, 49 C.F.R. $ 192.505 and49C.F.R. $8 195.302&304.
68 Fed. Reg. 4278,4302 (Jan. 28,2003).
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Because many pipelines cannot accommodate a smart pig and hydrotesting is
costly and interrupts service, other methods are used to monitor pipeline integrity. These
are broadly known as "direct assessment." Direct assessment includes several different
technologies used to monitor pipeline integrity including visual inspection, ultrasonic
testing and X-ray

examination^.^^ This method has the disadvantage of all sampling

methods - it does not inspect the entire pipeline, only the areas chosen for sampling. If
there is an area that has a corrosion problem but it is not among the areas sampled, that
corrosion will go undetected.
Causes of Pipeline Accidents
The most frequent causes of pipeline accidents are corrosion (about 23%lg0and
excavation damage (about 15%)~'
and operator error (about 4%).

Less frequent causes are weld defects (about 4 - ~ % ) ~ '

''

Corrosion may be internal (coming from within the pipeline) or external. The
corrosiveness of the material transported by the pipeline is the greatest risk factor.84
To prevent external corrosion, pipelines are coated to protect the pipe wall and
cathodic protection is used.''

Cathodic protection applies electric current to the pipeline

to prevent corrosion.86

" 68 Fed. Reg. 4278,4280 (Jan. 28,2003).
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86 Id.
81
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Excavation damage accounts for 12-17% of pipeline incidents?' To reduce this
problem, laws require that excavators notify a "One Call" system 48 hours before
excavating.
Seam weld failure accounts for only a small percentage (4-5%) of pipeline
ac~idents.8~
This type of failure occurs almost exclusively on pipelines constructed
before 1970 using anow abandoned welding technique.sgOperator error and incorrect
operation also account for about 4-5% of

accident^.^

Conseauences h m Different Accident Causes
Different accident causes can result in dramatically different consequences. By
way of illustration, on hazardous liquid pipelines in 2002, there were twice as many seal
failures (12) as weld failures (6):' Nonetheless, the less common weld failures
accounted for 33% of all damages from hazardous liquid pipelines although they only
accounted for 4% of the number of accidents?' Meanwhile, seal failures accounted for

8.6% of accidents but only 3.8% of the damages.93 This is because a seal failure is likely
to be a smaller, more easily contained leak. A weld failure can result in the entire 50-foot
longitudinal seam opening and material being pumped out until the control room figures
out what has happened and shuts down the pipeline. One of the more memorable fatal
pipeline accidents resulted from a seam weld failure in Mounds View, ~ i n n e s o t a ? ~

87

Supra, note 80.
Id. (for hazardous liquid pipelines, seam weld failure accounted for 4.31% of incidents hut 33.68% of
damages).
89
JOHN F. KIEFNER & CHERYL J. TRENCH, OIL PIPELINE CHARACTERISTICS
AND RISK FACTORS:
ILLUSTRATIONS mOM THE DECADE
OF CONSTRUCTION
34 (2001).
90 Supra, note 80.
9' Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
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PIPE FAILURES
ON
H A Z A ~ ULIQUID
S AND GASTTWNSMlSSlON PIPELINES
1 (1989).
88

Whether the pipeline that ruptures is a liquid or natural gas pipeline will
dramatically affect the area impacted and the likely consequences. Remember that there
are only about half as many miles of liquid pipelines as natural gas transmission
pipelines?5 Yet, liquid pipelines have had 2.3 times as many accidents as natural gas
transmission pipelines over the last fifteen years.96 On a per mile basis, liquid pipelines
have more fatalities and injuries?' Liquid pipelines have caused almost 2.5 times as
much property damage as natural gas transmission pipelines although they account for
only one-third of the mileage?* Part of the reason for this drastic difference is that
liquids can flow long distances once they escape from the pipeline and impact large
areas99whereas natural gas pipeline ruptures generally cause localized, though severe,
damages.loO
Because of these differences, no discussion of pipeline safety is complete if it
speaks only of the frequency of incidents. An effort to make pipelines safer must focus
not only on reducing the overall numbers of accidents but especially on reducing those
accident causes that have the most severe consequences.

95

See supra, notes 17 and 18.

" OFFICE OF PIPELINESAFETY, HAZARDOUS LIQUIDPIPELINE OPERATORS ACCIDENT SUMMARY STATISTICS
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LIQUIDPIPELINE OPERATORS ACCIDENT
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IW Letter from Mark V. Rosenker, Vice Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board to U . S . Dep't. of
Transp. Docket No. RSPA-00-7666; Notice 4 (Apr. 30,2003) (on file with author).

THE HISTORY O F THE PIPELINE SAFETY LAWS
The first statute regulating pipeline safety was the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety
Act of 1968.'''

Congress added liquid pipelines to the statute in the Pipeline Safety Act

of 1979.Io2 This was followed by the Pipeline Safety Reauthorization Act of 1988,1°' the
Pipeline Safety Act of 1992,Io4the Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act of
1996,Io5and now the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2 0 0 2 . ' ~ ~
Who's Who in Pipeline Safety
Congress created the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) in 1968IWto oversee and
implement pipeline safety regulations. OPS is an agency in the Department of
Transportation (DOT) and is under the Research and Special Programs Administration
(RSPA).'~' OPS inspects interstate pipelines while states are responsible for intrastate
pipelines.109
Historically, OPS has had a poor record as a regulator almost since inception. In
1978, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that OPS had weak enforcement,
inaccurate records, and ineffective rules."0 Twenty-two years later in 2000, the GAO

Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-481,83 Stat. 720 (1968).
'"Pipeline Safety Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-129, $5 201-218,93 Stat. 989 (1979).
'03 Pipelie Safety Reauthorization Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-561, 102 Stat. 2805 (1988).
Ic4 Pipeline Safety Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-508,106 Stat. 3289 (1992).
Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-304,110 Stat. 3793 (1996).
IM Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-355,116 Stat. 2985 (2002).
lo' Jeff Nesmith and Ralph K.M. Haunuitz, Pipeline Ofjice is Small Agency with Big Job and Many Critics,
AMERICAN-STATESMAN,
JuI. 22,2001.
h~://www.austin360.com/aas/s~eciaIre~orts/~i~eIines/22~i~eo~s~html.
(accessed 3/8/03).
los Id.
'09 49 U.S.C.A. 8 60104(c) (2001).
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produced another report that came to virtually the same conclusions.''' Testimony for the
Pipeline Safety Act of 2002 brought Congress many of the same complaints.''2
One of the agencies complaining was the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB), which investigates serious pipeline accidents.'" The NTSB routinely makes
recommendations to public or private entities about safety measures that could have
prevented accidents it investigates.'I4 While those recommendations have no force of
law, they are generally taken seriously. OPS has the lowest implementation rate of
NTSB recommendations (69%) of any agency in the Department of ~rans~ortation.''~
Even the pipeline industry as a whole has a higher rate of implementation of NTSB
recommendations (87%)'16 than OPS.

RECENT ACCIDENTS THAT SPURRED CONGRESS TO ACT
Since Congress last addressed pipeline safety in 1996, two particularly dramatic
accidents have occurred, one on a hazardous liquid pipeline and one on a natural gas

'"

U.S. GEN.ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THEOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETYIS CHANGINGHOWIT OVERSEES THE
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5 (2000).
Reauthorization of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the House Comm. on Energv and Commerce
(Mar. 19,2002) (testimony of Bruce Niles, Attorney, Earthjustice Oakland Regional Office);
Reauthorization of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Highways and Transit of the House Comm. of Tramp. and
Infmsmrcture, (Feb. 13,2002) (testimony of Mark R. Dayton, Dep. Assistant Inspector General of the U.S.
Dep't of Transp.)
' I 3 Reauthorization of the National TransportationSafety Board: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Sci., and Tramp. (June 25,2002) (testimony ofMarion C. Blakey, Chairman, Nat. Transp.
Safety Bd.) (Serious pipeline accidents are those that cause a fatality, substantial property damage or
si iticant injury to the environment.)
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5 (2000).
'I5 Pipeline Safety Act: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., (May 1 1 ,
2000) (testimony of John Hammerschmidt, Member, National Transportation Safety Board)
'I6 id.

pipeline. These accidents provide a helpful framework in understanding the measures
Congress subsequently imposed in the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002.
The BeNingham, Washington Pipeline ~ccident"'

The impetus for stronger legislation began in 1999 on a sunny June afternoon in
Bellingham, Washington, a city of 61,240 people.118The Olympic pipeline, allegedly
operated by Equilon Pipeline Company LLC, (a partnership of Texaco and

hell),"^

ruptured and poured 237,000 gallons of gasoline into Whatcom Falls park.I2O The
gasoline exploded, sending a mile and a half fireball roaring through Bellingham and
generating a mushroom cloud one a half miles long and six miles high.12' TWOten-yearold boys and an eighteen-year-old young man were killed."'

The gasoline flowed three

miles through downtown Bellingham and into Bellingham ~ a ~ . ' ~ '

In addition to the deaths, a single-family residence and the Bellingham water
treatment plant were severely damaged.124Testing and repairs put the pipeline out of
service for eighteen months.Iz5 The loss of productivity and lost profits led an upstream

ARC0 refinery to seek $563,603,764just in damages h m the loss of use of its
refinery.'26 At least one long-standing employee of the Bellingham Fire Department
resigned his position as a paramedic rather than face another such experience.I2'
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Bellingham.org web site, www.bellineham.or~eIlineham.asr.
accessed 1/14/2003.
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Skye Thompson Olvmuic Pipeline Exulosion: A Rehos~ective(One Year Later). THEPLANET.
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12' NTSB BELLMGHAM REPORT,supra at note 99 at 1.
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Olympic Pipeline Retrospective, supra note 121 at 4-5.
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NTSB BELLMGHAM
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Ericka Pizzillo, Olympic to Resfart Fuel Pipeline Today, BELLMGHAM
HERALD,
Feb. 8,2001.
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ARCO's Answer, Counterclaims and Cross-Claim at 8, Olympic Pipe Line Co. v. Equilon Pipeline Co.
LLC, No. C01-1310.
Olympic Pipeline Retrospective, supra at note 121, at 33.
'I9

When NTSB reported the results of its investigation, Board Member John Goglia
summed it up this way: "If it could be done wrong, it certainly appears (the pipeline
operators) did it wrongly."'28 The NTSB Chairwoman said she was struck by the "litany
of failures all around."'29 Some of the causes of the accident that the NTSB identified
included: (1) damage done to the pipeline by a contractor constructing a water treatment
plant and ineffective inspection of that construction work by Olympic; (2) inaccurate
evaluation of internal inspection done by Olympic; (3) Olympic's failure to test a safety
valve installed at a newly constructed refined products terminal; (4) Olympic's failure to
investigate and correct unexplained shutdowns; and (5) Olympic's practice of performing
computer database work while that computer was operating the pipeline.'30
OPS also investigated the accident independently of NTSB. Ln addition to
conclusions similar to those of the NTSB, OPS alleged that the company had nothing
more than on the job training for its pipeline control room operators."'
The company was indicted by a federal grand jury.132Olympic and two of its
employees pled guilty to a felony under the Pipeline Safety ~ c t " ' (failure to train
pipeline control room employees). The manager and control room operator received
prison

sentence^."^ One employee pled guilty to a misdemeanor violation of the Clean

Water Act (for turning the pipeline back on after safety mechanisms shut it down upon
128

Matthew Daly, Fatal Blast Blamed on Olympic, Excavator, KMG C O ~ I.,
N Oct. 9,2002 (on file with
author).
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Katherine Pfleger, NTSB Faults Pipeline Firm in Deadly 1999 Explosion, S E A ~TIMES,
E
Oct. 9,2002
(on file with author).
NTSB BELLMGHAM
REPORT, supra at note 99 at 72.
I ' ' Notice of Probable Violation and Civil Penalty, Office of Pipeline Safety CPF No. 5-2000-5013, June 2,
2000, to Equilon Pipeline Co. and Olympic Pipeline Co. p. 5.
Indictment, U.S. v. Olympic Pipe Line Co., Inc., Equilon Pipeline Co., LLC, Frank Hopf, Jr., Ronald
Dean BrentSon, and Kevin Scott Dyvig, (No. CR01-338R).
133
Plea Agreement at 1, U.S. v. Frank Hopf, Jr. (No. CR01-338R); Plea Agreement at 1-2, U.S. v. Ronald
Dean Brentson (No. CR01-338R); Plea Agreement at 2, U.S. v. Olympic Pipe Line Co. (No. CRO1-338R).
'31 Steve Miletich, Execs in Pipeline Blast Get Prison Time--A First, SEAITLETIMES,
Jun. 19,2003 (on
file with author).

sensing the loss of pressure).135 Equilon pled nolo contendere to a felony violation for
failure to train its employees."6 The two companies agreed to criminal and civil
penalties and safety improvements costing $1 12 mil~ion."~(Earlier in a civil lawsuit, the
companies had agreed to pay $75 million to settle wrongful-death suits.)"' These
prosecutions were the only time in the thirty-year history of pipeline safety laws that the
criminal sanctions were imposed.139
The Carlsbad, New Mexico Pipeline Accident

In the summer of 2000, one year after the Bellingham accident, activists kom that
community were actively lobbying Congress for stronger legislation. By April, three
different bills were under con~ideration.'~~
Unfortunately, this would all prove too late to
save twelve campers peacefully fishing near the Pecos River near Carlsbad, New Mexico
the morning of August 19,2000.
A 50-year-old El Paso natural gas pipeline ruptured nearby.I4' The campers were
675 feet away142with a small campfire and a Coleman lantern.143The ensuing explosion

set off seismographs fourteen miles away.'44 The resulting flame was 500 feet high145
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Plea Agreement at 1, U.S. v. Kevin Scott Dyvig (No. CR01-338R).
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Gene Johnson, Oficials Sentenced in Pipeline Blast, SEATTLEPLCOM,
Jun. 18,2003 (on file with
author).
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Steve Miletich, Execs in Pipeline Blart Get Prison Time-A First, SEATTLE
TmES, Jun. 19,2003 (on
file with author).
I4O S. 2004, 106' Cong. (2000) (The Pipeline Safety Act of 2000, introduced in January, by Senator Patty
Murray from Washington state); S. 2409, 106' Cong. (2000) (The Pipeline Safety and Community
Protection Act of 2000, inhoduced in April by Senator Hollings was the Administration's proposal): and
S.2438,106" Cong. (2000) (The "King and Tsiowas Pipeline Safety Act of 2000," introduced by Senator
McCain, was named after the two ten-year-olds that died in Bellingham.)
NATIONAL
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Id. at 9.
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Ten Dead, Two Cling to Life. ROSWELLDAILY
RECORDNEWS,
Aug. 21,2000.
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Fritz Thompson, N.M. Tech Instrument Logged 3 Sound Waves,ALBUQUERQUE
I., Aug. 23,2000, at Al.
145
CARLSBAD
NTSB REPORT,
supra note14 I, at 12.
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and burned for almost an

During that time, rescuers were kept a half-mile away

because they were afiaid to get closer for fear the paint would be burned from their
Six campers were killed instantly, six died later of their injuries.'48 The
ensuing NTSB investigation found that the 50-year-old pipeline had internal corrosion
that had gone undete~ted.'~~
The NTSB concluded that El Paso's corrosion control
program "failed to prevent, detect or control internal corrosion within the company's
pipeline."'50
The NTSB also criticized the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS). NTSB pointed out
that OPS had conducted 18 safety inspections at El Paso fiom June 1990 to August 1998
and in every case, OPS had concluded that El Paso's internal corrosion program was
satisfactory."' After 1998, OPS launched a "new" inspection program. In the eight
inspections between July 1999 to September 2000, compliance with internal corrosion
regulations was again "sati~factory."'~~
Nonetheless, after the accident, an OPS
inspection found numerous faults including problems with internal corrosion control."'
The company is presently being investigated by a federal gand jury.'54
Like Bellingham, there were consequences beyond the twelve deaths. Nearby
steel suspension bridges were extensively damaged.'55Three vehicles were destroyed.'56
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'51 Notice of Probable Violation Proposed Civil Penalty and Proposed Compliance Order from R. M.
Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, U.S. DOT to John W. Somerhalder II,Pres.,
El Paso Energy Pipeline Group (June 20,2001).
I54
El Paso Cop. Form 10-Q for the period ending Mar. 31,2003, at 21.
CAUBADNTSB REPORT,supra note 141. at 1.
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The pipeline was out of service for almost a year.157That service interruption allegedly
contributed to the severity of the California energy crisis.158
These two accidents provide themes that help provide a framework for
understanding Congressional action in the new pipeline safety law. Although pipeline
accidents are infrequent, their devastating consequences have damaged public
confidence159and made siting of new pipelines much more d i ~ i c u l t . ' ~ ~

THE PIPELINE SAFETY ACT OF 2002
Le~islativeHistory
By the fall of 2000, the Senate had voted on a bill (S.2438) and referred it to the
of the sections of what would become the final 2002 bill were present
~ o u s e . ' ~Many
'
but the bill was much weaker and had fewer mandates. Because it was late in the session,
the House could only consider it by suspending its rules, which meant it would take a
two-thirds vote to pass it.I6' Pipeline safety advocates opposed the bill. The parents of
the children killed in Bellingham criticized the bill's excessive faith in the Office of
Pipeline Safety saying, "If you tell an agency to do something twenty-two times and they
ignore you, by what logic do you think they will pay attention the twenty-third time?163

Michael Coleman, Pipeline that Killed Twelve near CarlsbadReopened, ALBUQUERQUE J., Jul. 7,2001.
Reply Brief of El Paso Natural Gas Co. at 3-5, Public Utilities Commission of the State of Califo~niav.
El Paso Natural Gas Co., Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n (No. RP00-241-006).
I59
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(June 21,2002).
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s a f e ~ MacDonald, Residents Voice
Fears Over Proposed Pipeline, LANSING
STATE JOURNAL,Jan. 5,2002.
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The King and Tsiorvas Pipeline Safety Act of 2000, S. 2438, 106' Cong. (2000) (this bill was named
after the two ten-year-olds that died in the Bellingham explosion).
146 Cong. Rec. H9548,9557 (Oct. 10,2000) (Rep. Barton's remarks, "But we are late in the session, so
we have put the Senate bill on the floor under suspension of the rules, which means it will take a two-thirds
vote to pass this legislation later this evening.")
Marlene Robinson and Bruce Brabec, Frank and Mary King, Katherine Dalen and Edwin Williams,
Pipeline Safely: Don't Sacrifice the Goodfor the Status Quo, SEATTLETIMES,
Oct. 6,2000 (on file with
author).
158

Congressman Inslee of Washington said, "I am not a scientist. ... But there is one thing I
do know, and that is that nobody has ever gotten a different result by doing the same
Congressman Pascrell of New Jersey said, "...the people who do the
inspections [of pipelines] do not even have to be trained. Now, who are we kidding?"16'
Although 59% of the House voted in favor of the bill that the Senate had approved, it
failed to get the necessary two-thirds majority and was r e j e ~ t e d . ' ~ ~
One of the representatives that voted in favor of S.2438 was Don Young of
Alaska, 16' the powerful Chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee. He was not a fan of a prescriptive new statute for pipeline safety. In June
2001, Young stated that he thought DOT and OPS had sufficient statutory authority
without significant statutory changes.'6s Two events associated with security and
pipelines may have contributed to his change of heart six months later.
Naturally, the events of September 11,2001, made everyone think more about
security. To add to those concerns, in October 2001, a lone dmnk gunman in Alaska
fired a rifle at the Trans-Alaska pipeline and started a leak, shutting down one-sixth of
U.S. oil production and causing one of the worst spills in the history of that pipeline.169
Coming on the heels of September I lth,this demonstrated the vulnerability of a major
pipeline to a security breach. By December 2001, Young had introduced his own bill,
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146 Cong. Rec. H9548-01, H9557 (Oct. 10,2000) (Mr. Inslee's remarks).
'"Id. (Remarks of Mr. Pascrell).
146 Cong. Rec. H9573 (Oct. 10,2000) (the roll call was yeas 232, nays 158, not voting 42).
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Press Release from U.S. Rep. Don Young, Chairman, House Comm. On Transportation and
Wastluchlre, June 27,2001.
169 BP 2001 EnvironmenWSocial Review. Available at
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highlighting security as well as pipeline safety.I7OSignaling a tough fight for pipeline
safety advocates, he explained that his new bill would provide a "less prescriptive
approach"17' to pipeline safety. The House referred the bill to Young's Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure and Rep. Tauzin's (R-La) Committee on Energy and
Commerce.
In February 2002, the Subcommittee on Highways and Transit of Chairman
Young's Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure held the first hearings in the
House and received testimony from pipeline safety advocates (including the mother of
the 18-year-old killed in el ling ham),'^^ industry representatives,173the Office of the
DOT Inspector ~ e n e r a l , "and
~ a pipeline employee union repre~entative.'~'
In March, the Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality of Rep. Tauzin's
Committee on Energy and Commerce held its hearings receiving testimony from the

N T S B , ' ~industry
~
representatives,'77a union representative,17' various nonprofits with

I" Pipeline hiktructure Protection to Enhance Security and Safety Act, H.R. 3609,107' Cong. (2001) (as
introduced in the House Dec. 20,2001).
171
Press Release for The Pipeline lnfrastn~ctureProtection To Enhance Security and Safety Act ("This hill
enerally differs from other approaches in that it is less prescriptive...") (on file with author)
Reauthorization of the Ofice of Pipeline Safety: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Highways and
Transit of the House Comm. on Trans. And Infratruchrre (Feb. 13,2002) (testimony of Marlene
Robinson).
17' Hearings: Before the Subcomm. on Transp. and Infrosfructure of the House Comm. on Highways and
Transit (Feh. 13,2002) (testimony of William 1. Haener, Executive Vice President Natural Gas, CMS
Energy Corp. on behalf of the Interstate Natural Gas Ass'n. of Am.)
I" Reauthorization of the Pipeline Safety Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Highways and
Transit of the House Comm. on Transp. and Infrastruchrre (Feb. 13,2002) (testimony of Mark R. Dayton,
Deputy Assistant Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation).
175 Hearings on the qftice ofpipeline Safety: Before the Subcomm. on Transp. and Infrartruchrre of the
House Comm. on Highways and Transit (Feb. 13,2002) (testimony of Ryan P. Berg, President, General
Workers Committee PACE International Union).
Reauthorization of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act:
Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the House Comm. on Energv and Commerce (Mar. 19,
2002) (testimony of Robert Chipvevich, Dir., Office of Railroad, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Investigations, National Transp. Safety Bd.)
'77 Reauthorization of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act:
Before the Subcomm, on Energy and Air Quality of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce (Mar. 19,
2002) (testimony of William J. Haener, Vice Pres. Of Natural Gas CMS Engineer Corp.); Reauthorization

''

interest in preventing pipeline spills"9 and the Administrator of the DOT Research and
Special Programs Administration that oversees the Office of Pipeline ~ a f e t ~ . Much
' ~ ' to
Rep. Young's chagrin, Rep. Tauzin's committee passed its own bill as a substit~te.'~'
The two powerful House committees finally negotiated a compromise'82to bring
the measure to a vote on July 23,2002 where it passed, almost unanimously.'83 The bill
headed for the Senate where the Senate version of the pipeline safety bill was part of the
massive Energy Policy Act of 2002.'~~
Ultimately, complicated issues doomed the energy bill (e.g., whether to drill in the
Alaska Wildlife Refiige), but the conferees managed to salvage the pipeline safety
provisions.'85 The Chairmen and Ranking Members of the House Committees accepted
amendments from the Chairmen and Ranking Member of the Senate Commerce
~omrnittee."~The Senate passed the amended version by unanimous consent on

of the Nahrral Gas Pipeline Safely Act and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safely Act: Before the Subcomm.
on Energy and Air Quality of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce (Mar. 19,2002) (testimony of
Mark L. Hereth, Senior Vice President, HSB Solomon).
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Bruce Niles, Staff Attorney, Earthjustice Oakland Reg'l. Office).
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2002) (testimony of Ellen G. Engleman, Adm'r. Research and Special Program Administration, U.S.
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November 13,2002.~~'The House did the same the next day.'''

The President signed it

into law on December 17,2002."~

THE PIPELINE SAFETY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2OOZSECTION BY
SECTION

The new law contains twenty-six Sections that cover the gamut of issues related
to pipeline safety. The following provides some of the highlights of the new law and,
where applicable, shows how the new law might have affected past accidents.
Section 1. Short Title
Despite its introduction in the House as the "Pipeline Infiwtructure Protection to
Enhance Security and Safety ~ c t , " by
' ~ the time both Houses had completed their work,
all of the Sections expressly addressing securityI9' had been deleted and the final bill was
no longer about security -.

The short title of the final bill is "Pipeline Safety

Improvement Act of 2002."'~~
Section 2. One-Call Notification Promarns
One of the main reasons that pipelines are a safe means of transportation is that
they are below ground, away from public ~ 0 n t a c t . IOn
~ ~the other hand, out of sight can
mean out of mind for excavators who may inadvertently breach a large pipeline carrying
148 Cong. Rec. S10967 (Nov. 13,2002).
148 Cong. Rec. H9007 (Nov. 14,2002).
189
Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, H.R. 3609, 107" Cong. (2002).
I" Pipeline Infrastructure Protection to Enhance Security and Safety Act, H.R 3609, 107" Cong. (as
introduced in the House).
19' Compare Pipeline Iniiastruclure Protection to Enhance Security and Safety Act, H.R. 3609,107" Cong.
(as introduced in the House) with Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, H.R. 3609, 107" Cong.
(enrolled bill) (note that Section 5. Safety Orders and Security Recommendations, Section 11. Security of
Pipeline Facilities, and Section 14. Pipeline Security-Sensitive Information have all either been deleted or
were changed to remove the word "security.")
'91 Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-355,116 Stat. 2985 (2002).
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natural gas or hazardous liquids. This is known as "outside force damage,"'94 and is a
leading cause of pipeline accidents.19'
Outside force may also be one of the most preventable causes of pipeline
incidents via programs requiring excavators to call a central locating system known as a
"One-Call" System before beginning work. Congress has regularly addressed One-Call
Notification Programs in pipeline safety laws. 196,197
Despite previous legislative measures,19*excavation damage continues to
endanger communities. Such damage was one of several factors that led to the 1999
Bellingham pipeline explosion.'99

In the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, Congress directed the Secretary
to encourage adoption of a cooperative industry study called "Common Ground Study
~ ~provided
~
funding for that purpose.20' Congress also did some fineBest ~ r a c t i c e s "and
tuning to make plain that compliance with One-Call Notification programs applied to
government operators of pipelines or government excavators or contractors.202These

194

The category of outside force damage also includes landslides and earihquakes although these are a
small percentage of the accidents categorized as "outside force."
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Energy and Commerce, (Mar. 19,2002) (testimony of Robert R. Kipp, Executive Director, Common
Ground Alliance).
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The Common Ground Alliance is a nonprofit organization dedicated to shared responsibility in the
damage prevention of underground facilities. See, Reauthorization of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act
and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act: Hearing Before the Subcornm. on Energy and Air Quality of
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce (Mar. 19,2002).
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Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-355, g 2(c) Implementation of Best Practices
Guidelines, 116 Stat 2985 (2002).
'02 Id at 12(a).

measures were not wntroversial-in

fact this Section went through both Houses virtually

without amendment from the Introduction of the bill to its final approval.203
Section 3. OneCall Notification of Pipeline Ouerators
Criminal penalties have applied for failure to notify pipeline operators before
excavating since 1992."~ However, a court interpretation in 1999, made it virtually
impossible to criminally prosecute an excavator that damaged a pipeline unless he did so
intentionally. 205
Congress changed this interpretation so that the only intent requirement is that the
excavator knowingly and willfully engages in excavation. If he subsequently damages
the pipeline, even if it is unintentional, he can be prosecuted under this statute provided
that he "knows or has reason to know'""

of the damage and fails to notify the pipeline

operator. Criminal penalties can be reduced for promptly reporting the damage to the
pipeline operator.207
This provision might have prevented the Bellingham accident had it been in place
eight or nine years earlier. In its report about that accident, the NTSB alleged that an
excavator, IMCO General Construction, Inc., damaged the pipeline during the
construction of the Bellingham water treatment plant in 1993 or 1994.~'~
One witness
interviewed by NTSB reported that the pipeline was damaged during excavation and a
decision was made not to notify the pipeline operator but to coat the damaged area and
re-bury the pipeline. Under the new law, such action could lead to criminal prosecution.
Comnare H . R 3609,107' Cong. 5 2 (as introduced in the House) with H.R. 3 6 0 9 , 1 0 7 ~Cong. 5 2
(enrolled bill).
2M Pipeline Safety Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-508, $304, 106 Stat. 3289 (1992).
205
U.S. v. PiummerExcawting, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1015 (1999).
'06 Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-355,t 3(c) One-Call Notification of Pipeline
Oyerators, Criminal Penalties, 116 Stat. 2985 (2002).
Id. at 53(c)(4).
208
NTSB BELLINOHAM
REPORT,
supra note 99 at 17-25,56-69,71.
203

Knowledge of such consequences might prevent a contractor from making the same
decision again but one does wonder what efforts are being made to make excavators
aware of the provisions of this law.
Section 4. State Oversight Role
Congress was told by both the General Accounting 0fficeZo9and an organization
that represents state pipeline inspector^^'^ that state inspectors would do a better job than
OPS inspectors. Since the adoption of the first pipeline safety law, Congress has
provided a means whereby States could take over inspections of some pipelines.211
Improving state oversight was part of S.2438 (the bill that almost passed Congress
in the fall of 2000),2'~and S. 235, which the Senate approved in ~ e b r u a2001.'
r~ "
However, Chairman Young did not propose such measures in his "less prescriptive" bill
in December 2001 .'I4 The House Committees added the State Oversight section215and
from that point on the Section remain

lo9 OBce ofPipeline Softy Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Mar. 19,2002 at (testimony of Peter F. Guerrero, Dir. Of
Physical Infrastructure Issues, General Accounting Off~ce).
''O Hearings Before Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci.and Transp., (May 4,2000) (testimony of Charles R.
Kenow, Vice-Chairman of National Association of Pipeline Safety, "...recent actions by DOT to
summarily limit the states' past role in inspecting interstate pipelines remains of concern... The removal
and limitation of state resources is analogous to disengaging a seasoned, trained force and their field
commander from the battlefield and replacing them with a force from a foreign counhy that does not know
the local customs, people, terrain or rules of engagement...History has proven, more than once, this isn't
the way to win the battle.")
2" Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act, Pub. L. 90-481 5 5,82 Stat. 720,722-23 (1968).
"2 S. 2438, 1 0 6 Cong.
~
8 9 State Oversight Role (reported in the Senate, August 25,2000).
'I3 S. 235, 107"' Cong. 8 9 State Oversight Role (passed Senate on Feb. 8,2001, see, 147 Cong. Rec. S
1205.
'I4 Pipeline Infrastructure Protection to Enhance Security and Safety Act, H.R. 3609, 107" Cong. (2001) (as
introduced in the House Dec. 20,2001).
215
Pipeline Infrastructure Protection to Enhance Security and Safety Act, H.R. 3609 5 22, 107" Cong.
(2001) (as engrossed in the House Jnl. 23,2002).
216
Compare Pipeline Inhtructure Protection to Enhance Security and Safety Act, H.R. 3609 5 22, 1 0 7 ~
Cong. (2001) (as engrossed in the House Jnl. 23,2002) with Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002,
H.R. 3609 8 4, 107" Cong. (2002) (as enrolled in the House Nov. 15,2002).

In this Section, Congress changed the balance of power between the States and
the federal government where pipeline safety was concerned. Although the Secretary
continues to retain sole authorization for enforcement,2" States have considerably
broader power to take over inspection of interstate pipelines. This Section enumerates
the determinations the Secretary must make to grant a State inspection authority, so that
States know what is

Congress entirely re-wrote the process for "Ending

Agreements" to make two separate categories of termination (permissive vs. mandatory)
and expressly provided that the Secretary may give a State an opportunity to correct
deficiencies before ending an

Although the previous statute already

required notice and a hearing before terminating an agreement, the new statute delineates
the process required for termination by expressly providing a section titled, "Procedural
Requirements." The Section also requires the Secretary respond to State allegations of
violations of pipeline safety standards.220The prior law mandated that the State inform
the Secretary of such violations, but didn't require the Secretary to respond.22' Under the
new law, the Secretary must act within 60 days to either take appropriate enforcement
action or provide written notice to the State why the Secretary decided against
enforcement.222 These measures will all give considerably more direction to the
Secretary and more power and influence to the States.

'I7
81'
9I'

Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, H.R.3609 5 4(a)(3), 107' Cong. (2002).

Id.
Id.at 4 4(b).

"
~ dat.
"I

4(cj.

49 U.S.C.A. 5 60106(b) (2001).
"Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, H.R. 3609 5 4(c)(2), 107' Cong. (2002).

Section 5. Public Education Prosams
Public education in communities near pipelines can save lives.223 Such programs
promote the use of One-Call systems to reduce outside force accidents, explain the
hazards of leaks to residents.224Public education programs have been part of pipeline
safety laws since at least 1 9 7 6 but
~ ~they
~ have applied only to natural gas pipelines.226
The new law modified the language to include hazardous liquid pipelines.227In
addition to the former requirement for education about using One-Call systems, and
hazards resulting h m leaks, the new law requires education about how to recognize
leaks, and what steps to take if a leak is suspected.228While the old law didn't say who
to educate (other than the "public"), the new law specifies that the education programs
must advise municipalities, school districts, businesses and residents in the location of the
pipeline.229The new law requires the Secretary (or the appropriate State agency) to
periodically review these programs.230
Early versions of the bill also contained a Community Right-to-Know
provision.2" That provision did not survive. Although many proponents of pipeline
safety believed that communities affected by pipelines should have a right to know about
them,232security concerns made the discussion too controversial to include in the pipeline
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Gas Pipeline Safety Act Amendmnts of 1976, Pub. L. 94-477 8 8,90 Stat. 2073 (1976).
U649U.S.C.A. 5 60116 (2001).
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Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002. H.R. 3609 5 5,107' Cong. (2002).
=Id.
229 Id.
Id.
Compare Pipeline Infrastructure to Enhance Security and Safety Act, H.R. 3609 5 6 (2002) (as reported
in the House Jul. 23,2002) with Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, H.R. 3609 (the final version
lacks a Section on Community Right to Know).
232
148 Cong. Rec. H5273 (Jul. 23,2002) (remarks by Rep. Larsen and remark by Rep. Durn).
US Natural

safety bill and was deferred to later consideration in the broader context of homeland
security legislation?33
Had this new Section been in place in 1996, it might have prevented a grim
accident in Lively,

exa as.'^^

Two teenagers died when they smelled gas and drove to get

help.235 Their truck ignited the butane cloud. The NTSB concluded that a public
education program would have likely prevented the accident.236A public education
program might have informed them how to recognize a leak and what to do or not to do if
a leak is suspected:37 (e.g., don't start a car or use anything that might create a spark).
The new law will make such education mandatory for communities that live near both
liquid and gas pipelines.
Section 6. Protection of Em~loveesProviding Pi~elineSafetv Information
Unions testified to Congress that pipelines would be safer if employees could
notify regulators about safety problems before accidents occurred without fear of
retribution from their employers.238The Government Accountability Project had been
seeking this protection for employees of Alyeska (the operator of the Trans-Alaska
There was also a suggestion that employees within Olympic Pipeline
(whose pipeline had exploded in Bellingham) had been complaining about at least one

233 Id. (remarks by

Rep. Dunn).
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2.'8 Reauthorization of the Nahrral Gas Pipeline Safety Act and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safefy Act:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Enerm and Air Quality of the House Comm.on Energy and Commerce,
107' Cong. (Mar. 19,2002) (testimony of Edward C. Sullivan, President, Bldg. And Trades Dep't., AFLCIO); The m c e of Pipeline Safefy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Highways and Transit of the House
Comm. on Transp. and Infasfruchrre 107' Cong., (Feb. 13,2002) (testimony of Ryan P. Berg, President,
Gen. Workers Comm PACE International Union).
Press Release, Government Accountability Project, Whistleblower Protection for Pipeline Workers
(Nov. 15,2002) (on file with author).

safety issue to Olympic management but that complaint went unheeded.240Had action
been taken, the accident could have been prevented.
Whistleblower protection was part of S.2438 and S.235 that passed the Senate in
2000 and 2001 respectively.24' While it was not in Chairman Young's first proposal, his
committee added it.242This Section provides a procedure for employees who want to
report a pipeline safety problem to regulators but fear retaliation from their employer.
The Department of Labor will oversee a complaint process and may, if the facts warrant,
order reinstatement, back pay, and compensatory damages to the complaining employee.
Pipelines now are added to the short list of regulated activities for which the U.S.
Department of Labor provides heightened protection against potential retribution for
employees alerting regulators to potential violations at their company.243
Section 7. Safetv Orders
This Section adds a new part to § 601 17 that gives the Secretary authority to order
necessary corrective action for a "potentially safety related condition." The Secretary's
authority includes whatever corrective action is "necessary," including physical
inspection, testing, repair, or replacement. This Section was not controversial and passed
almost unchanged from the version that was introduced. The only pertinent change was
that the version introduced by Chairman Young pertained to a "potentially unsafe

140 Ericka Pizzillo,

OIympic Terminal "Nightmarish"Before Blast that Killed Three, BELLINOHAM

HERALD,
May 19,2002 (on file with author).
S. 2438,106' Cong. 5 15 (as engrossed in the Senate); S. 235, 107' Cong. 5 15 (passed Senate Feb. 8,
2002,see, 147 Cong. Rec. S1205).
Press Release, U.S. House Comrn. on Transp. and Infrastructure, Bipartisan Pipeline Safety Legislation
Overwhelmingly Approved by House Transportation Committee; Bill Approved by 55 to 13 Vote (May 22,
2002) (on file with author).
243
U.S. Dep't, of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration, Discrimination Against Employees
Who Exercise Their Safetv and Health Riehts.~,available at
httu:llwww.osha.navlas/o~,dworkerlwhistlewh.
The list includes such activities as asbestos abatement,
protection of clean air and water, proper disposal of hazardous substances, aviation, and corporate fraud.
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condition"244while the Senate broadened that to a "potential safety-related ~ondition."~~'
The Office of Pipeline Safety requested this Section so that corrective action could be
taken immediately rather than waiting for an accident to prove that the facility was
unsafe.246
Section 8. Penalties
The Office of Pipeline Safety's (OPS) use of penalties and enforcement has been
a sore point with pipeline safety advocates. The City Attomey for Fredericksburg,
Virginia testified that penalties amounted to less than five cents per barrel spilled.247The
General Accounting Office reported that Office of Pipeline Safety had virtually
abandoned fines as an enforcement measure.248
Furthermore, under the language of the old law, the Secretary could only shut
down a pipeline or order corrective action if he found that a pipeline "is hazardous."249
There was no provision for preventive action. In essence, the Secretary's authority was
limited to waiting for an accident to prove that a pipeline was hazardous in order to
require corrective action.
The amendments provided by this Section should go a long way to resolving this
issue. Virtually every committee that considered this issue provided for increased
penalty authority but as the bill moved through Congress, this Section grew teeth.

H.R. 3609, 1 0 7 ~
Cong. 5 5 (2002) (as introduced in the House).
H.R. 3609,107" Cong. 5 7 (2002) (engrossed in the Senate).
148 Cong. Rec. S11067 (Nov. 14,2002).
Pipeline S a m : Hearlng Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci.,and Transp., 106' Cong. (May
11,2000) (testimony of James M. Pates, City Attomey of Fredericksburg, Virginia on behalf of the
National Pipeline Reform Coalition).
''' U.S. GEN.ACCOUNTINGOFFICE,THE OWICEOF PIPELJNE SAFETYIS CHANGING
HOW IT OVERSEES THE
PIPELINE INDUSTRY 26 (2000) (The GAO reported that OPS proposed fines in only 4% of enforcement
actions in 1998).
249
See49 U.S.C.A. 5 601 12 (2000). Pipeline facilities hazardous to life and property.
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While the bill introduced by Chairman Young merely increased penalties by 50100%,2~~
the House Committees increased the penalties further (100-300%), and added
more provisions.25' The new language authorized the Secretary to take corrective action
if a pipeline "is or would be" hazardous. [Emphasis added.] The former 5 60122(b) did
not authorize the Secretary to consider harm to the environment in setting penalties;252
the House remedied that omission.253Another addition to this section permitted the
Secretary to consider economic benefit gained from the violation without reduction for
subsequent damages. The former § 60122e) mandated that the Secretary consider "other
matters that justice requires." The new law makes such consideration discretionary (the
Secretary "may" consider) so that the Secretary has more control over the process.254
The new language for 5 60120(a) clarified the judicial powers conferred in the
statute for civil actions. Courts are now expressly authorized to, (1) enforce conective
action orders issued under 5 601 12; (2) issue temporary or permanent injunctions; and (3)
assess penalties.
The former 3 60123(b) provided criminal penalties for damaging an interstate
pipeline facility, whether gas or liquid. The House Committees added language that
includes intrastate pipeline facilities that are used in interstate commerce.25s
2JOH.R.3609,107~Cong. 5 6 (ihoduced Dec. 20,2001).
251
H.R. 3609,107" Cong. 5 6 (engrossed in the House July 23,2002).
252 Thi .
s is a glaring omission since liquid pipelines have caused $787,823,712 in property damages
SAFEN,
(including harm to the environment) over the last fifteen years, see OFFICEOF PIPELINE
HAZARWUS
LIQUID PIPELINE
OPERATORS ACCIDENT SUMMARY
STATISTICS BY YEAR, I1111986 11/30/2002.
253 H.R. 3609, 107'~
Cong. 5 6 (engrossed in the House July 23,2002).
2Y .I...d

'''

This new language may necessitate rulemaking to clarify the defiition of intrastate hazardous liquid
pipeline in 40 C.F.R.195.3. There, an interstate pipeline is defined as one used in interstate or foreign
commerce and an intrastate pipeline is defined as not an interstate pipeline (and presumably
used in
interstate commerce.) If, by def~tion,an intrastate pipeline is not used in interstate commerce, the new
language added by the House Committees would seem to have no application in the case of hazardous
liquid pipelines.

The changes made by the House Committees were still not strong enough for the
Senate. The Senate insisted that the Comptroller General conduct a study of policies and
procedures in assessing and collecting fines and penalties for pipeline operators.256That
study is to be completed within one year of enactment of the Act and should serve to
keep the enforcement issue on the front burner.
This Section was sorely needed. Although the Secretary has assessed fines for
some of the recent major accidents, as of this writing, neither the Bellingham fine ($3.05
million assessed in June 2000 for an accident that occurred in June 1999) nor the
Carlsbad fine ($2.525 million assessed in July 2001 for an accident that occurred in
August 2000) 257 have yet been collected.
Section 9. Pipeline Safety Information Grants to Communities
This entirely new section provides $1 million annually for ''technical assistance"
grants that local groups and nonprofit organizations could use to promote pipeline safety
It opened a great divide between the Chairman Tauzin's House
in their ~ommunities.'~~
Energy and Commerce Committee and Chairman Young (R-AK) who complained, "I
didn't know we were in the business of funding anti-pipeline activists."259 His concerns
were ultimately resolved in the Senate where that Chamber added an exception to prevent

256

H.R 3609,107~Cong. 8 8(d) (engrossed in the Senate Nov. 13,2002).

"'Notice of Probable Violation and Proposed Civil Penalty from Chris Hoidal, Director, Westem Region,
Office of Pipeline Safety to Mr. Carl Gast, Vice President and Gen. Manager, Equilon Pipeline Co., LLC
(June 2,2000) (on file with author) (assessing a penalty of $3,050,000); Notice of Probable Violation and
Proposed Civil Penalty from R.M. Seeley, Director, Southwest Region, Office of Pipeline Safety to John
Somerhalder 11, President, El Paso Energy Pipeline Group (June 20,2001) (assessing a penalty of
$2,525,000).
2'8 James C. Benton, House Pipeline Security Bill Hindered by Committee Spats on Its Way to Floor
Action, CQ WEEKLY,Jun. 15,2002 at 1600.
2J9
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funding community groups working on safety of the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline in Chairman
Young's home state.260
The technical assistance provided in the new 5 60130 can be used to pay for
engineering and scientific analysis of pipeline safety issues, not litigation or lobbying
efforts. It includes promotion of public participation in official proceedings. The Senate
also required annual reporting to the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation and
House Energy and Commerce Committees as to the identity and location of each
recipient, the purpose of the grant, and a description of how the grant was used.
Section 10. Operator Assistance in Investigations
This Section amended two parts of the old statute and was added by the

ena ate.'^'

The old 601 18 merely required that a company permit access to and copying of records.
It did not require owners or operators of facilities to assist in the investigation of
accidents. The new law makes such assistance mandatory provided that it doesn't
interfere with constitutional rights (e.g., the 5'hAmendment right against selfincrimination). It also gives the Secretary the authority to direct a pipeline operator to
relieve an employee of duty if the Secretary fmds the employee substantially contributed
to the incident.

--

--

260 Compare H.R. 3609, 107" Cong. 5 7(a) (2002) (as engrossed in the House Jul. 23,2002) with H.R.
3609, 107" Cong. 5 9(a) (2002) (as engrossed in the Senate Nov. 13,2002) (the later Senate version
excludes grants for Facilities regulated under Pub. L. 93-153.43 U.S.C.8 1651 et seq. That law pertains to
the Trans-Alaska pipeline.)
261
Compare H.R. 3609, 107" Cong. (2002) (the version engrossed in the House Jul. 23,2002 has no such
section) with H.R. 3609, 107' Cong. 5 10 (2002) (as engrossed in the Senate Nov. 13,2002).

Section 11. Population Encroachment and Rights-of-way
Unfortunately, this section gets the award for the one least likely to assist in
pipeline safety. In 1988, the Transportation Research Board and produced a study titled,
"Pipelines and Public ~ a f e t ~ That
. " ~report
~ ~ studied land use issues with respect to
pipeline safety. In the Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act of 1996,
Congress directed the Secretary to make a copy of that report available to a public official
in each state.263The Secretary finally completed that task in 2 0 0 1 . ~In~this
~ section of
the new law, Congress directs the Secretary to study the same things, (e.g., land use
practices, zoning ordinances), that were studied in the 1996 report and determine
effective practices to limit encroachment on pipeline rights-of-way. One wonders what
Congress hopes this study will achieve that the 1998 study did not achieve.
Section 12. Pipeline Inteeritv. Safetv. and Reliability Research and Development
This Section calls for research and development into several areas including
internal inspection and leak detection, detection of cracks, corrosion and other
abnormalities, and pipeline security. It brings together the expertise of the Department of
Energy, the Department of Transportation and the National Institute of Standards and
Technology. It has an interesting legislative history.

TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., PIPELINESAND PUBLIC
SAFETY
(1 988).

Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-304 5 16(a), 110 Stat. 3793
(1996).
i~ Compare
'
U.S. GEN.ACCOUNTING
OFFICE,
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INDUSTRY 60 (2000) (Table 1 l shows that the 1996 reauuemenl was not vet
completed) with U.S. GEN.ACCOUNTI~GOF&?, PROGRESS MADE,BW
AND
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17 (2001) (Table 5 shows that the 1996 requirement has been
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SIGNIRCANTREQU~REMENTS

It began as a stand-alone bill, H.R. 3929,265offered by two democrats on the
House Committee on Science, Ralph Hall and Lamar

That Committee made

two especially important findings:

1) Pipelines can become more susceptible to failure with age;
2) Interruptions in service on major pipelines.. . can have enormous

consequences for the economy and security of the United states?'
Because many of the pipelines in our nation are thirty to fifty years

these

findings present the possibilities for unpredictable service interruptions with major
economic impact, let alone fatal consequences.
In addition to these findings, recent accidents highlight the need for research and

development. There is a tendency to view internal inspection of pipelines as a panacea
However, "smart pigs" have two major drawbacks. First, only about 35% of natural gas
pipelines can accommodate them.269Replacing those pipelines would be very expensive.
Developing new means of testing pipelines or more accommodating internal inspection
devices would make it easier to monitor the integrity of those pipelines.
Second, while they excel at detecting corrosion, smart pigs are not effective for
detecting prior excavation damage, minute cracks, or other stress related damage.270By
way of illustration, several major accidents have occurred in the last few years on

148 Cong. Rec. H5273 (Jul. 23,2002) (remarks of Rep. Hall).
266H.R. Rep. No. 107-475, pt. 1 at 5 V. Committee Actions.
267 Id. at 5 2 Findings.
Pipeline Safety: Hearing bejbre the National Transportation Safety Board, Nov. 15,2000 (remarks of
Chairman Jim Hall).
269 Pipeline Safety Research andDevelopment: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy of the House
Comm. on Science, 107' Cong. (Mar. 13,2002) (statement of Terry Boss, Vice President, Environment,
Safety and Operations, Interstate Natural Gas Association of America).
270 Id.

pipelines that have been recently inspected.27' Obviously, mandating internal inspections
will not end all pipeline accidents and further research is needed to improve our ability to
ascertain the integrity of pipelines.
This Section of the statute forms a troika among the Department of
Transportation, the Department of Energy, and the National Institute of Standards and
Technology and directs this group to develop a five-year research plan on pipeline safety
funded with annual appropriations of $25 million. The legislative history of the bill
illuminates a problem that has faced pipeline safety advocates in the past and gives
evidence that Congress heard and responded.
The provision originally approved by the House required this troika to consult
with industry and state and local government about topics and priorities for research but
required merely that other parties272have an opportunity to provide "ad~ice.~"Given the
unresponsiveness of Office of Pipeline Safety in the past, this did not inspire confidence.
The Senate changed this language to require consultation with a broader array of groups
and put them all on an equal

giving reason for hope that communities

impacted by pipelines will be have a stronger voice in commenting on priorities for
research.
Section 13. Pipeline Oualification Programs
This Section probably has its roots in the Bellingham accident. Two of the
control room employees as well as Olympic Pipe Line Co. pled guilty to a failure to train
See, e.g., NATIONAL
TRANSP.
SAFENBD.,PIPELINE
ACCIDENT
BRIEFCOLONIAL
PIPELINE
CO., FEB.9,
TENNESSEE
7 (2001); NATIONALTRANSP.
SAFETYBD., PIPELINE ACC~OENTBRIEF
1999, KNOXVILLE,
MARATHON
ASHLANDPIPE LINE LLC, JAN. 27,2000, WINCHESTER,
KENTUCKY2 (2001); NATIONAL
TRANSP. SAFETY BD., PIPELINE ACCIDENT BRIEFEXPU)RER PIPELINE CO., h'fAR. 9,2000, GREENVILLE,
TEXAS 3 (2001).
272
E.g., environmental organizations or pipeline safety advocates, etc.
273 H.R. 3609, 107' Cong. 1 9(b)(2-3) (as engrossed in the House Jul. 23,2002).
271
H.R. 3609, 107' Cong. 5 12(d)(2) (as engrossed in the Senate Nov. 13,2002).
27'

their employees to operate the pipeline.275Equilon pled nolo contendere to the same
offenseY6 In essence, a control room operator at Olympic Pipe Line received nothing
more than on-the-job training to operate an ultra-hazardous facility canying huge
quantities of explosive material through a major city like Seattle with a population of 3.5
million.
The new Section requires that companies operating pipelines have a program in
place to test the qualifications of employees who work on tasks that may be regulated.
That testing may not be limited to on the job observation and must be documented in
writing. The Secretary must verify each program including modifications to each
program. There is a special pilot program for certification of individuals who operate
computer-based systems for operating pipelines.
When this Section was initially introduced, it was limited to pipeline control room
operators.277By the time it finished House consideration, it had been largely re-written
and pertained to anyone that performs a "covered task."278 A "covered task" is defined
by regulation.279It remained largely untouched by the Senate who only tweaked it
slightly, restricting waivers f b m the program to those not inconsistent with pipeline
safety, providing for intrastate pipeline operators to be supervised by the appropriate

27' Plea Agreement at 1, U.S. v. Frank Hopf, Jr. (No. CR01-338R); Plea Agreement at 1-2, U.S. v. Ronald
Dean Brentson (No. CR01-338R); Plea Agreement at 2, U.S. v. Olympic Pipe Line Co. (No. CR01-338R).
276 Plea Agreement at 2, U.S. v. Equilon Pipeline Co., LLC (No. CR01-338).
277 H.R. 3609, 1 0 7 Cong.
~
5 I0 (inwoduced in the House Dec. 20,2001).
H.R. 3609, 1 0 7 Cong.
~
5 I0 (engrossed in the House Jul. 23,2002);
2nFor natural gas pipelines, it is defmed in 49 C.F.R. 5 192.801(b) and for hazardous liquid pipelines it is
defmed in 49 C.F.R. 5 195.501@). Essentially it includes anything required to be done on a pipeline by
regulation that is part of operations and maintenance and affects the operation or integrity of the pipeline.

State regulatory agency and requiring a report from the Secretary about the Qualification
program one year earlier than the House (four years instead of five).280
Section 14. Risk Analvsis and Integlitv Management Programs for Gas Pipelines
While the previous section of the bill grew out of the Bellingham accident, this
one grew out of the Carlsbad accident. That accident killed 12 people and the ~ p h r e d
pipeline segment had never been inspected in 50 years.28' Ironically, a nearby segment
had been modified in the 1970's so that it could be inspected.282Moisture accumulated at
a low point in the uninspected segment and corroded the pipe

Internal inspection

devices excel at detecting corrosion, so if that segment had been able to accommodate
internal inspection devices, the accident would not have happened.284 The solution is
obvious. Natural gas pipelines should be internally inspected.
Unfortunately, making all natural gas pipelines able to accommodate internal
inspection devices would be extremely costly. In the rulemaking that RSPA has been
canying out to comply with the new law, the Interstate Natural Gas Association of
America (INGAA) has suggested that the cost of compliance with this section could be as
high as $17.6 billion dollars over the next twenty years.285 This cost adds to the cost
people pay for natural gas. The industry argued that it is unreasonable to expect pipelines
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g 10 (engrossed in the House Jul. 23,2002) with H.R. 3609,107~
Cong. 5 13 (engrossed in the Senate Nov. 13,2002).
Press Release, Chairman Jim Hall, National Transportation Safety Board, Statement on Carlsbad, New
Mexico Pipeline Accident (Aug. 24,2000) (on file with author).
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CARLSBADNTSBREPORT,
supra note 141 at 16.
lS3Id. at 41.
Id. at 50.
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Comment Letter from Terry D. Boss, Senior Vice President, Environment & Safety Operations,
Interstate Nahlral Gas Association of America to Dockets Facility, U.S. Dep't. of Transp. 9 (Apr. 30,2003)
(on file with author).

"'

to be inspected in remote places like where the Carlsbad accident occurred?86 The
industry has also sought to exclude pipelines near rural churches or bingo halls from
having to be inspected, reasoning that such places are infrequently occupied?87 This
debate continues to frame the testimony about integrity management for natural gas
pipelines.
Also unfortunately, the statute is less than clear about what is required. The
language says that a risk analysis is required for facilities located in areas identified
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. $60109(a)(l) and 49 C.F.R. 192, "including any subsequent
modifications." But $ 60109(a) merely tells the Secretary to establish criteria for
identifying pipelines located in a "high-density population areamz8*and doesn't define
that term.
Confusingly, while the statute uses the term "high population area," RSPA's
rulemaking defined the term "high consequence area" on August 6,2002 in 49 C.F.R. 8
192.761?89(Note that the industry is trying to narrow this definition through a petition
for reconsideration of the ~ l e m a k i n ~ The
. ) ~Congressional
~~
Joint Managers for the new
bill also seemed to use the term "high consequence area" as an apparent synonym for
"high population area.~ 2 9 1

-

286

Comment lener fiom Teny D. Boss, Interstate Natural Gas Ass'n. of Am. To Dockets Facility, U.S.
Dep't. of T m p . 3 (Mar. 1I, 2002).

Id.
"'49 U.S.C.A. §60109(a)(l)(A) (2001).
67 Fed. Reg. 50834 (Aug. 6,2002).
'90 Petition for Reconsideration from the Am. Gas Ass'n., the Am. Pub. Gas Ass'n., the Interstate Natural
Gas Ass'n. of Am., and the New York Gas Group to Dockets Management System U.S. Dep't. of Transp.
Docket No. RSPA-00-7666 (Sept. 5,2002).
29' 148 Cong. Rec. S11067 (Nov. 14,2002) (the Joint Manager's Statement that is intended as legislative
histoly for the bill describes Section 14 as follows: "In this section, each operator of a gas pipeline facility
is required to conduct a risk analysis for facilities located in high consequence areas and to adopt and
implement an integrity management program for each such facility to reduce associated risks.") [Emphasis

added.]

Since there is no statutory definition of high-density population area, the new law
is ambiguous as to what Congress may have intended. However, the legislative history
resolves the problem in at least two different ways.
First, the Joint Manager's statement expressly refers to the RSPA rulemaking and
endorses its approach:
"The Department of Transportation's Research and Special Programs
Administration (RSPA) issued a final rule defining "high consequence
areas" on August 6,2002. The managers strongly support RSPA's
regulation defining high consequence areas, although recognize that the
definition could be subject to alteration by future regulatory action by
RSPA. ... In the July 2002 Technical Pipeline Safety Standards
Committee meeting to consider the proposed definition, RSPA made clear
its intent to include in its definition known areas where people gather,
such as the Pews River pipeline crossing near Carlsbad, New Mexico
which was commonly used by campers and fishermen and was the
location of a pipeline rupture in August 2000 that resulted in 12 fatalities.
The managers support is expressed for this new definition of high
consequence areas.. .9.292
The Carlsbad accident was obviously on the conferees' minds in explaining this
section of the bill. Their intent that such areas should be covered by integrity
management requirements is unmistakable. However, this report is not the only support
in the legislative history that argues that Congress meant to require that pipelines like the
one.near Carlsbad should be inspected under the new law.
In the fall of 2 0 0 0 , ~Congress
~~
considered S.2438, the Pipeline Safety
Improvement Act of 2000. That bill had an inspection requirement that was different
from the present bill but the language as to where pipelines must be inspected was almost

'
9
1

148 Cong. Rec S11067-11069, November 14,2002.

"The accident occurred on August 19,2000.

the same as the present law.294Remarks in the Congressional Record supporting the bill
mention the Carlsbad accident again and again. There were comments such as "This bill
will help us avoid these tenible accidents in the future."295"...the need for the legislation

was highlighted by two recent pipeline explosions in Washington state and New
~ e x i c o . ""[after
~ ~ referring to the Carlsbad accident]. ..The authors of this bill were
determined to put the necessruy specific requirements into the pipeline safety statutes that
would prevent these kinds of accidents from happening again."297 Plainly, these
legislators thought they were doing something to prevent another Carlsbad type accident.
Although S.2438 was not finally approved, the debate and commentary about
Carlsbad continued the following year. Both New Mexican Senators sponsored a
bipartisan bill, S.235, the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2001.~~'
Once again, with
the same language as the year before as to where pipelines needed to be inspected:99
there were floor speeches about Carlsbad. "[Hoping it would be passed quickly] so that
the Office of Pipeline Safety can get about the business of better inspections to avoid
catastrophes such as we faced near Carlsbad this last year."300 "I am here today

... to

work so that we don't have to think twice before camping with our families and friends. I

am here to do my part,. .. so that pipeline tragedies like in Carlsbad, do not happen

Compare S.2438 that calls for inspection in areas "identified pursuant to subsection (a)(l) [of 9 601091
with H.R.3609 that calls for inspection in areas "identified pursuant to subsection (a)(l) and defined in
Chapter 192 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, including any subsequent modification.. ." Note that
the earlier law would have also required inspection of hazardous liquid pipelines but that had already been
accomplished through mlemaldng (65 Fed. Reg. 75405-06 (Dec. 1, 2000)), maldng such a requirement
su emuous. The reference to Chapter 192 ties the statute to the regulations for natural gas pipelines.
~~'146Cong. Rec. E1777-03 (Oct. 10,2000) (remarks of Rep. Joe Skeen).
%
'
146 Cong. Rec. H9548-01 (Oct. 10,2000) (remarks of Rep. Green).
146 Cong. Rec. S10894 (Oct. 23,2000) (remarks of Sen. Lon).
298 147 Cong. Rec. S1176-03 (Feb. 8,2001).
299 147 Cong. Rec. S1176-03, S1200 (Feb. 8,2001) (pipelines would have to be inspected "in mas
identified pursuant to subsection (a)(l)").
' 0 0 147 Cong. Rec. S1176-03 (Feb. 8,2001) (remarks of Sen. Bingaman).

"'

again,m30~

‘G

[After refemng to the Bellingham and Carlsbad accidents] These tragedies,

with their accompanying loss of life, are the basis for everyone's concern.. .lives and
property are at stake."302In the face of statements such as these, it is difficult to believe
that these Senators didn't think their legislation would result in pipelines being inspected
where people gather to camp and fish.
If this Section is properly applied, it will eventually be a critical piece in
preventing mass accidents such as happened in Carlsbad, New Mexico. However, it is
likely that such places will be inspected later in the first ten years rather than sooner.
Congress mandated that companies inspect the highest risk pipelines first. In the
meantime, pipelines are only getting older. What was made plain by the Carlsbad
accident is that absent some form of meaningful inspection, companies are blindly
operating corroding pipelines filled with explosive materials. What makes matters worse
is that people have no way to know about the integrity status of a pipeline. It seems
doubtful that anyone would realize that companies allow some segments to corrode until
they explode. Now that inspections will be mandatory, some requirement may need to be
added to post uninspected areas to notify people to maintain a safe distance.
Section 15. National Piveline Matwing System
Congress mandated a national inventory of pipelines in 1992.~') OPS began to
work with industry in 1994 to create a standardized mapping system to which operators
could provide data; that system was completed in 1998. However, OPS did not mandate
that companies submit their maps, prefemng a voluntary approach that allowed

'O'

147 Cong. Rec. S1176-03 (Feb. 8,2001) (remarks of Sen. Domenici).

'"147 Cong. Rec. S1176-03 (Feb. 8,2001) (remarks of Sen. Corzine).
"'OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL,
U.S. DEP'T.OF TRANSP.,
AUDITREPORT PIPELINE
SAFETY
PROGRAM,
RESEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS
ADMINISTRATION 3 (2000).

companies to submit their data as they wished. By January 2002, OPS had only acquired
mapping for 64% of total pipeline mileage, although the statute mandating that inventory
was passed in 1992?04
Modem up to date mapping of pipelines is an essential component of regulation.
Obviously, it is difficult to credibly assert that an agency inspects pipelines and imposes
suitable protections for high consequence areas when it can't even locate them. In
addition, local governments can't effectively plan and zone around pipelines when they
can't locate them. Although companies have been providing maps to local governments,
the quality of those maps varies widely.
By way of illustration, maps provided to three New Mexiw counties ranged from
detailed, up-to-date maps made with global positioning software (Williams Energy
Services) to barely legible, much reduced copies of 1964 USGS quadrangles (Equilon
~i~eline)."'One can hardly expect a local government to do prudent land use planning
about pipelines or provide emergency response for pipeline accidents when the maps that
they have are decades out of date and unreadable. The statute will make modem up-todate maps of pipelines in their area available to local governments through Section 15(c).
Furthermore, even companies are sometimes unaware of the names of
communities along their pipelines. In Lively, Texas, when a Koch pipeline ruptured, the
company didn't know where Lively was and had to call the local sheriff to get directions.
While the 91 1 operators were trying to answer emergency calls &om citizens concerned

Reauthorization of the Pipeline Safety Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Highways and
Transit of the House Comm. on Transportation, 107mCong. (Feb. 13.2002) (testimony of Mark R. Dayton,
Deputy Assistant Inspector General, U.S. Dep't. of Transp. Mr. Dayton described this progress as "too
little, too late.")
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THEPIPELINE
GROUP,EMERGENCY RESPONSE MANUAL
FOR EMERGENCY
RESPONSE PERSONNEL
OF
BERNALILLO,
SANWVAL
AND VALENCIA
COUNTIES OF NEWMEXICO(2000).
'04

about the explosion and fire, they were also having to give directions to Koch Industries
in Wichita, Kansas to tell them where Lively, Texas was.'06 If Koch had had an updated
map, they might have !mown where Lively was.
The new law requires that all pipeline operators307provide geospatial data to the
National Pipeline Mapping System and requires that the operator keep that information
updated. The party with primary operational control must be identified. Congress also
provided that the Secretary may provide technical assistance to communities so that they
can adapt their emergency response systems to utilize the National Pipeline Mapping

System.
Section 16. Coordination of Environmental Reviews
When regulations were promulgated for integrity management of hazardous liquid
pipelines,308RSPA imposed three deadlines (Immediate, 60 days, and 180 days) within
which companies must repair defects in pipelines in high consequence areas?* The
deadline for repairing a defect differed based on the likely risk posed to the integrity of
the pipeline. However, this presented companies with a dilemma. Some permits would
take longer to get than the deadline allowed for completion of the repair. This new
Section responds to this concern.
This was a hotly debated Section. The original proposal by Chairman Young
included not just "repair" but also "rehabilitation" projects?'0 it permitted the Secretary
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Audio tape: Kaufmam County, Texas, Sheriffs Dep't. and 91 1 Response during the Lively, Texas
Pipeline Explosion and Emergency Response (Aug. 26, 1996) (on the tape, the Koch employee is told that
the uioeline that exuloded is in Livclv. Texas. but the emulovee
does not have a man that shows
, a~uarentlv
Lively and does not know where it is. At least ten times, the man asks for directions to Lively while
o erators and sheriffs employees are hying to respond to the emergency.)
38 The statute excludes distribution and gathering pipelines.
lo* See, 49 C.F.R. g 195.452.
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Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas. 49 C.F.R. 195.452 6 (h)(4)(i-iii).
310
H.R. 3609,107" Cong. 5 13 (as introduced in the House Dee. 20,2001).
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of Transportation to terminate the jurisdiction of a federal agency that did not complete
its review of the project by the Secretary's deadline; it also provided that the Secretary
could define the purpose and need for the project?'1 None of those provisions survived
in the final ~ersion."~
The statute directs the President to establish an Interagency Committee to develop
a coordinated environmental review process. The Chairman of the Council on
Environmental Quality chairs that committee (not the Secretary of Transportation as
Chairman Young proposed). Members include all agencies with responsibilities for
permitting activities related to pipeline repair. The Committee is to prepare a
compendium of best practices for access, excavation and restoration of a pipeline repair
site and enter into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) among those agencies to
provide expedited permitting for companies who need to repair pipelines. That MOU
requires the unanimous consent of all agencies on the Committee, assuring that
environmental protection would remain important. Congress expressly provided that this
Section did not preempt any Federal, State or local environmental law.
There is no definition of what is meant by "repair" under the statute. The statute
refers only to a "coordinated environmental review and permitting process in order to
enable pipeline operators to commence and complete all activities necessary to cany out
pipeline repairs within time periods specified by rule by the Secretary." This language
would seem to preclude covering other activities that would not normally be considered a
"repair," for example, a conversion of a pipeline from one use to another that requires
major rehabilitation. The savings provision that continues to require compliance with all

rd.

"'Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, Pub.L. 107-355 5 16,116 State 2985 @ec. 17,2002).

federal, state and local environmental laws would seem to prevent this Section from
becoming a Trojan horse that allows pipeline operators to escape compliance with
environmental laws.
Section 17. Nationwide Toll-Free Number Svstem
This simple provision directs the Secretary, in conjunction with the Federal
Communication Commission to establish a single nationwide three-digit telephone
number for one-call notification. This was requested by Common Ground Alliance in the
belief that it would enable better promotion of and compliance with One-Call
Notification
Section 18. Imvlementation of Inspector General Recommendations
The Department of Transportation Inspector General (DOT-IG) had prepared an
audit of the Office of Pipeline Safety that skewered the agency.'I4 The DOT-IG reported
that as of the year 2000, OPS had not completed mandates Congress had passed in 1992
and 1 9 9 4 . ~OPS
' ~ put only 25% of its research dollars into internal inspection despite the
fact that such tools have been proven reliable for detecting corrosion and research may
enable them to detect additional types of

OPS safety inspectors had only

minimal training in the use, capabilities and interpretation of internal inspection data
despite the fact that internal inspection was becoming a central part of the agency's
integrity management program."7 Reporting categories for pipeline accidents were so
broad and general that 26% were reported as caused by "Other," thus making it
'I3 Pipeline Safety: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the House Comm. on
Energy and Comm., 107' Cong. (Mar. 19,2002) (testimony of Robert R. Kipp, Executive Director,
Common Ground Alliance)
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL,
U.S. DEP'T.OF TRANSP.,
AUDIT REPORTOF THE PIPELINE SAFETY
PROGRAM
(2000).
'I5 id. at 3.

"'

'I6

id.

'"Id. at 4.

impossible to do any trend analysis or make meaningfil assessments about causes of
accidents."'

Regulations did not permit OPS to require a pipeline operator to correct its

accident reports even if substantial changes were plainly warranted. In eight
transmissions accidents investigated by the NTSB, in three cases NTSB found a different
cause than reported by the operator and five investigations found $20.4 million dollars
more property damages than reported.319Finally, despite a DOT order that required
agencies to develop and submit timetables to NTSB for addressing safety
recommendations, RSPA had not provided timetables for 21 of 23 NTSB
recommendations and some were outstanding since 1987:~~The DOT-IG made specific
recommendations to address all of these failures.
In this Section of the Statute, Congress mandated that the Secretary implement all
of those DOT-IG recommendations. To give the Secretary an incentive to comply,
Congress required the Secretary to submit progress reports on the implementation of
those recommendations every ninety days to oversight Committees in the House and the
Senate until all recommendations were implemented.
Section 19. NTSB Safetv Recommendations
There is already a statute that requires the Secretary of Transportation to formally
' new statute reiterates that
respond to each recommendation made by the N T S B . ~ ~The

this includes recommendations made pertaining to pipeline safety. It also requires public
availability of the Secretary's response and annual reporting to Congress as to the
Secretary's responses.

Id.

id. at 5.
320 Id.
311

Secretary of Transportation's Responses to Safety Recommendations. 49 U.S.C. 8 1135 (2003).

Section 20. Miscellaneous Amendments
Buried in what seems like an innocuous Section, is a virtually summary of
Congressional intent with respect to the new law. Before this new statute, federal law
provided merely "minimum safety standards."322 In this Section, Congress set out a new
mupose for pipeline safety to provide "adeauate protection against risks to life and
property posed by pipeline transportation and pipeline facilities by improving the
regulatory and enforcement authority of the Secretary of ~rans~ortation."~~'
[Emphasis
added.] In addition, Congress provided that persons "selected from the general public" to
serve on the Technical Pipeline Safety Standards Committees in 49 U.S.C.

3 601 15 must

not have a significant financial interest in the pipeline, petroleum or gas industry. The
Joint Managers statement clarified the intent of this last provision. It is intended to
prevent industry employees and those with a sizeable stake in the pipeline industry from
serving in slots intended for the general public. It is not intended to prevent service from
individuals who may have stock in such companies in their retirement plans.324
This Section sums up the new law--Congress wanted: (1) higher safety standards
(adequate, not minimum), (2) increased federal enforcement, and (3) assured
representation by the public in DOT procedures.
Section 21. Technical Amendments
As the name suggests, these are just technical amendments.

U.S.C.8 60102(a)(l) (2001).
Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-355 5 2O(a), 1 16 Stat. 2985 (2002).
148 Cong.Rec. S11067 (Nov. 14,2002).
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Section 22. Authorization of Ap~ropriations
It is interesting to compare the appropriations provided for pipeline safety ten
years earlier (about $9 million)325to what Congress provided in this bill ($45-50million).
This is a significant increase and seems to indicate Congressional recognition that part of
the problem in the Ofice of Pipeline Safety may have been inadequate resources.
Section 23. inspections bv Direct Assessment
Direct assessment includes visual examination of the pipeline, ultrasonic
examination and x

method^.'^'

- R ~OPS
~ ?does
~ not
~ yet have completed confidence in these

Operators who wish to use direct assessment will have to provide written

justification to OPS explaining why internal inspection is not economically feasible.328
Section 24. State Pipeline Safety Advisory Committees
The Section was inserted by the

and requires that the Secretary respond

to recommendations for improvements from State Pipeline Safety Committees appointed
by a Governor within ninety days. This Section of the statute shows again that Congress
intended that States should have a strong voice in pipeline safety.
Section 25. Pi~elineBridge Risk Study
The Section was also inserted by the senate."'

The Secretary is only permitted to

use funds specifically appropriated for this purpose.

Pipeline Safety Act of 1992. Pub. L. 102-508 55 114,214, 106 Stat. 3289 (1992).
Fed. Reg. 4278,4279 (Jan. 28,2003).
Teleconference Notes: Making Sense of Pipeline Integrity Legislation and Proposed Regulation" (Feb.
26,2003). Docket No. RSPA-00-7666-173 (Presentation by Mike Israni).
328 68 Fed. Reg. 4278,4279 Jan 28,2003).
Compare H.R. 3609, 107 Cong. (as engrossed in the House Jul. 23,2002; this version does not contain
such a Section) with H.R. 3609,107' Cong. § 24 (as engrossed in the Senate Nov. 13,2002).
j30 Compare H.R. 3609, 107' Cong. (as engrossed in the House Jul. 23,2002; this version does not contain
such a Section) with H.R. 3609,107" Cong. § 25 (as engrossed in the Senate Nov. 13,2002).
326 68
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Section 26. Studv and Report on Natural Gas Pipeline and Storage Facilities in New
England

In this Section, Congress was concerned about potential shortages of natural gas
for gas fired power plants in New England. It requires the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission and the Department of Energy produce a study on the natural gas
transmission network and natural gas storage facilities in New England. The Senate
added this

WOULD THESE CHANGES HAVE PREVENTED PREVIOUS ACCIDENTS?

Serious pipeline accidents tend to be a result of a concatenation of unwise
practices that finally coalesce into one horrible ~onflagration?~'This was certainly true
of the Bellingham accident. Analyzing the NTSB Report from that accident, several
Sections of this bill would seem to reduce the potential for such carnage to be visited
upon another city. Four of the five major safety issues identified by the NTSB are
addressed by the new statute:
1)

Excavation damagesections 2 and 3, One-Call Notification Requirementsthe new criminal penalties might have given the construction company an
adequate incentive to notify Olympic Pipe Line Co. of the damage to its
pipeline rather than just re-burying the damaged pipeline.
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Compare H.R.3609, 107' Cong. (as engrossed in the House Jul. 23,2002; this version does not contain
such a Section) with H.R 3609, 1 0 7 ~Cong. 9 26 (as engrossed in the Senate Nov. 13,2002).
332 See NTSB BELLMGHAM
REPORT,supra note 99 at 71. (This report lists at least nine different things that
went wrong to result in the Bellingham accident.)

2)

Flawed interpretation of intemal inspection results-Section 13, Qualification
Programs-might

ensure that those who evaluate intemal inspection reports

are better trained so they don't miss critical information.
3)

Adequacy of management of construction of a new terminal-Section

6,

Whistleblower protection-employees of Olympic Pipe Line Co. had
complained to management about the frequent unexplained shutdowns of
valves to no avail. This new provision might resolve such complaints before a
pipeline ruptures from one too many sudden shutdowns.
4)

Performance and security of computer system-Section

13, Qualification

Programethe system administrator of the computer system at Olympic Pipe
Line Co. had no formal training and his actions just prior to the accident may
have contributed to the failure of the computer system. The statute provides a
special pilot program for certification of individuals who operate computerbased systems for controlling the operations of pipelines.

Whether the new statute would have prevented the Carlsbad accident is an open
question. In the present ~lemaking,the industry is seeking a substantial limitations on
the requirement to inspect natural gas pipelines. If the industry succeeds in excluding
places like Carlsbad from inspection requirements, then one would have to conclude that
Congress failed to change the status quo.

WHAT MORE COULD CONGRESS DO?
It has been said that the two things you don't want to watch being made are
sausage and legislation. That was certainly the case here. The effort started out with a
bill named after two of the children killed in the Bellingham accident.333 Eventually
industry lobbying weakened the bill so much that that the parents of those children
withdrew their support. As is often the case, this statute is far from perfect and doesn't
please everyone.
Based on history, pipeline safety gets Congressional attention when bad accidents
occur. Certainly, one hopes that bad pipeline accidents are part of our history, not our
future. In case that proves not to be the case, the following are some suggestions of ways

that present laws could be changed to improve the situation.
1)

Strict liabilitv for hazardous liquid pipeline soills. Annually, there are

many more spills per mile fiom hazardous liquid pipelines than from natural gas
pipelines.334 If Congress were to implement strict liability for such spills with a penalty
based on the volume spilled, companies would have an economic incentive to work
harder at avoiding spills and reducing their magnitude. Based on the experience of the
natural gas industry, which has fewer leaks per mile of pipeline, improvement should be
possible. Furthermore, this would provide a way for communities to assess the
performance of pipeline operators-those paying fewer and smaller fines might be better
potential neighbors.
2)

Implement misdemeanor criminal offenses. In other environmental

statutes, there is a lower standard for prosecution of lesser offenses. For example, in the
333

The King and Tsiorvas Pipeline Safety Act of 2000. S. 2438, 106' Cong. (as introduced in the Senate).
According to the OPS 2002 statistics, there were 139 accidents on 161,189 miles of hazardous liquid
pipelines while there were 80 accidents on 287,000 miles of natural gas transmission pipelines.
3U

Clean Water Act, there are misdemeanor penalties that allow criminal prosecution for
negligent discharges.335The same should be true of pipeline safety. In fact, the Clean
Water Act already applies to pipeline spills where they contaminate water, so expanding
the coverage should not be unduly burdensome. The key to the next level of protection in
pipeline safety is to prevent the small, negligent accidents so that companies using
unwise practices do not develop bad habits that someday combine to produce one large
accident.

3)

Permit states to run the pipeline safetv p r o m and ex~resslvpermit

states to tax the pipelines within their borders on a per mile basis to pav for it. The Clean
Water Act permits states to take over the majority of the water pollution program from
the federal government?36 Pipeline safety laws should permit the same. States would be
far more likely to watch out for the safety of their citizens than a regional office of
federal workers who are overly influenced by industry.
4)

Enforcement in the sunshine. Require OPS penalty enforcement to take

place in public. Now, OPS publishes press releases when it proposes a fine on a
company but then releases no information on whether that fine has been collected. If
OPS had a public enforcement docket on the web similar to its rulemaking do~ket,~"
the
public could oversee the process.
5)

Remove federal preemption. Re-consider the need for federal preemption

of pipeline safety laws. Preemption is generally based on the need for uniform
regulation. However, pipeline companies often argue that every pipeline is different and

"'See, Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.5 1319(c)(2002).
Id. at 11342(b).
337
The docket is available at htt~:lldms.dot.~ov.

so "one size fits all" is wasteful and ineffe~tive.~~'
If that is true, it suggests that federal
preemption may similarly be unnecessary.

6)

Incentives for replacement of old oipelines. There is abundant evidence

that newer pipelines are considerably safer than old ones?39 Provide a streamlined
permitting process to replace old pipelines with newer ones and perhaps tax incentives to
replace older pipelines in High Consequence Areas.

7)

Rwuire oostine, of oioelines that are not inspected. As a pipeline ages, if

there is no requirement to inspect it, that amounts to a decision that it is acceptable for the
pipeline to blow up without warning. If a decision like that has been made, it seems the
least the company could do is to prominently post the area that it presents a danger and
inform the public what a safe distance to maintain would be.

8)

Move oioeline safetv to the Environmental Protection Agencv (EPA).

Congress has now given the OPS clearer, more defined statutory requirements. If the
performance of OPS does not improve, it should be dismantled and the responsibility
shifted to the EPA. This undoubtedly is the kind of suggestion that, as one industry
member put it, "make[s] some old timers shudder and today's pipeline managers
sweat."340However, the EPA has a considerably better reputation for understanding its
responsibilities to protect communities and guard the environment.

9)

Reduce corporate orotections for coroorate shareholders of oivelines.

Major corporations reduce their liability for pipeline accidents by purchasing shares of

"'Supra note 45.

F.KIEFNER & CHERYL
J. TRENCH, OILPIPELINE
CHARACTERISTICSAND RISKFACTORS:
ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE DECADE OF CONSTRUCTION
(2001).
339 JOHN
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Joseph C. Caldwell, Public's Concern Accelerates, PPE LJNE& GASINDUSTRY,
available at
httD://www.~iue-line.com/archive01-09101-09 safety.html.

small pipeline co~porations?~'These pipeline corporations may be inadequately
capitalized and may be forced into bankruptcy by a major

The large shareholder

corporation is insulated from liability for accident consequences by the corporate
structure. Congress should make it easier to pierce the corporate veil in such
circumstances so that the large corporations have a greater fiscal incentive to manage
their ownership in pipeline corporations more wisely.
10)

Lower the reauirements for citizen suits. Congress has limited the

circumstances under which a citizen can bring an enforcement action under the pipeline
safety laws.343Other environmental statutes give broader powers to citizens to help
enforce the law.3" This would be another way of giving the OPS more "backbone."

SUMMARY
The Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 was needed. Pipelines can be
safer. This statute mandates steps that many responsible industry members probably had
already taken voluntarily. Public education for communities that have to respond to
accidents from a company's facilities is good business. Up-to-date maps so that the
company knows the names of communities at risk are not too much to ask. Training
employees who operate and maintain hazardous facilities is reasonable on its face.
Periodically inspecting a 50-year-old transportation mechanism is something no airplane
passenger would fly without, yet the natural gas industry continues to operate pipelines
that are that old without inspecting them.
341
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See, e.g., NTSB BELLINGHAM
REPORT, supra note 99 at 1 (see footnote 1).

In fact, Olympic Pipe Line Company has filed for bankruptcy as a consequence of the Bellingham
accident.
343 The Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. 3 60121 (2002).
344
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.8 1363 (2002).

Experience has shown not all members of the industry do what is required to
protect people around their pipelines. They do only what is required by statute.
The natural gas industry continues to fight Congressional intent through its efforts
in the rulemaking on integrity management of natural gas pipelines. The industry reasons
that consumers would prefer to pay less for their energy. Obviously, one would always
like to pay less rather than more. The real question is whether we as a society should
permit innocent victims to die rather than mandate the use of thirty-year-old technology
to verify the integrity of pipelines.

CONCLUSION
Congressional intent in the Pipeline Safety Act of 2002 can best be summarized
by a story of one of the victims of the worst pipeline accident in 25 years:345
On August 19,2000, five-year-old Kirsten Sumler was enjoying the great
American outdoors with her mother, Amanda Smith. They were fishing on the banks of
the Pecos River with ten other members of their extended family. When the uninspected,
50-year-old El Paso pipeline exploded, it was so hot that it turned the desert sand to glass
and turned the concrete of a nearby bridge to powder. Later, when the rescuers were
finally able to approach, they tied to evacuate Kirsten first. She cried because she did
not want to leave her mother. Amanda told her to go with the fireman. She promised her
daughter that he would take good care of her.
Now, Kirsten was well beyond where good care would help and she died at the
bum unit in Galveston, Texas. Amanda died later.
)45

This story comes *om a conversation with Millyn Dolphin, the flight nurse that assisted in the
evacuation of Kirsten Sumler from the Carlsbad pipeline accident on August 19,2000.
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Amanda's promise to her daughter embodies the promise that Americans want
,f-l

from the pipeline industry. They want to know that the people in communities near
pipelines will be well taken care of. If those people are merely collateral damage in the
quest for cheaper energy, communities where new pipelines are proposed will quite
reasonably oppose that siting.
Certainly, members of Congress heard that message when they passed the
Pipeline Safety Act of 2002. Only time will tell whether the pipeline industry,
particularly those who operate natural gas pipelines, heard that message as well.

